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Judgements of whether a person intentionally caused harm are consequential—it can mean 
the difference between murder and manslaughter, for example. But how do people determine 
whether someone caused harm intentionally? According to The Trade-off Justification Model 
(TJM) people who cause harm without justifiable reasons are unintentionally signaling that 
harm was intentional because people without harmful intentions would not willingly decide 
to cause harm without sufficient reason. Consequently, people judge unjustified harms as 
intentional. Eight preregistered experiments (N = 1621) tested and extended this claim. 
Across a wide range of scenarios (Experiment 1) and cultures (Experiments 2a-3b) people 
tended to judge unjustified harms as intentional but justified harms as not intentional. 
Moreover, people changed their mind about whether a harm was intentional after learning 
reasons that made the harm justified or unjustified (Experiment 4). The last two experiments 
extend this claim by investigating how people judge whether a harm was justified. We show 
that people’s cultural (Experiment 5) and group (Experiment 6) identities set the 
norms/values they use to evaluate the justifiability of causing harm, thereby leading to 
different judgements about whether the harm was intentional. People’s perceptions of others 
are thus informed by their personal identities (which group/cultural membership is a part of). 
We close by discussing the implications of this for science—what morality’s theoretical role 
in this process is—and society—how individual differences in values and culture may create 
misunderstandings of whether a harm was intentional and cause conflicts between different 
political groups. 
Keywords: Attributions, Intentionality, Trade-off Justification Model, Signaling 
Theory, Individual Differences 
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A Sign of ill Intent: Unjustified Harming Signals Harm was Intentional 
On June 4, 2020 in Buffalo, New York, police were called in to control protests about 
George Floyd’s death. While clearing an area of protesters, a police officer shoved 75-year-
old Martin Gugino to the ground. He suffered a head injury when he hit the ground, was 
unable to walk for two weeks, and was hospitalized for 27 days (Rose & Levenson, 2020, 
June 16; Rose et al., 2020, June 30). There is no doubt the police officer caused harm, but 
people disagree whether it was intentional. Some people think the police officer did not 
intentionally harm Mr. Gugino—they intended to clear the area and accidentally used too 
much force on the old man. Other people think the harm was intentional—the police officer 
shoved Mr. Gugino too hard without any justifiable reason for using such aggressive force. 
This difference in perceived intentionality is important: If it was intentional, the shove was a 
clear crime: assault and battery; but if it was an accidental side-effect of following 
departmental procedures, there was no crime. Moreover, public reaction also depends on the 
intent—people who think it was intentional want the officer to be punished. 
Mr. Gugino’s example highlights the importance of understanding how people 
determine whether someone caused harm intentionally. With the importance of these 
judgements in mind, the topic of the current research is, “how do people determine whether 
someone caused harm intentionally?” Specifically, this research focuses on testing a pathway 
specified by the Trade-off Justification Model for how people determine whether a harm was 
caused intentionally. The Trade-off Justification Model (TJM) argues that people look at the 
justifiability of the harm to determine whether it was intentional. In essence, people consider 
whether there were any reasons (apart from intending the harm itself) sufficient to explain the 
person’s willingness to cause harm. If no other sufficient reason is found, then it shows that 
the person was willing to cause the harm, had no other justifiable reason for causing it, yet 
decided to cause it anyway. So, people think the harm was what the person intended and, 
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consequently, attribute it as intentional. Thus, in Martin Gugino’s case, TJM predicts that 
those who see the police officer’s actions as a justified use of force in dispersing potentially 
violent protestors will see the harm as not intentional, but people who see the officer’s actions 
as unjustified brutality in the service of putting down legitimate protests will perceive the 
same actions as clearly intentional. 
The predictions of TJM go far beyond Mr. Gugino’s situation: We conducted eight 
preregistered experiments (including two replication studies) testing TJM across situations 
ranging from CEOs causing environmental degradation, to parents causing their child misery 
through extra schooling, to building extensions blocking the neighbors’ views. Moreover, we 
believe this mechanism should apply across multiple cultures, therefore, we tested it in six 
countries: US, UK, China, Poland, South Africa, and New Zealand. We even explored how 
internalizing the norms and values of the groups and cultures people identify with can affect 
the perceived justifiability of causing a harm and how this can lead to differences in the 
perceived intentionally of a harm. Overall, we found support for the core prediction of TJM:  
that judgements of whether a harm was intentional are tied to the perceived justifiability of 
causing the harm. We conclude that intentionality judgements depend on whether the 
perceiver judges the harm to be justified and discuss the relevance of this insight for science 
and society.  
Attributing Intentionality 
People attempt to determine whether another’s actions were the product of personal or 
impersonal causes, driven by the self or the situation, and, crucially, whether they were 
intentional or accidental (Gilbert, 1998; Heider, 1985; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Nisbett, 
1972; Malle, 2006; McArthur, 1972). Determining whether an action was intentional, 
however, is inherently challenging because people do not have direct access to others’ mental 
states (Pronin et al., 2004)—the minds of others are invisible. Yet, children as young as 12-18 
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months seem to have some insight into the minds of others (Liszkowski et al., 2006; Moll & 
Tomasello, 2007), by 14-18 months distinguish between accidental and intentional action 
(Carpenter et al., 1998), by 25-months-old anticipate others’ intentions (Southgate et al., 
2007), and by 3-5 years old incorporate intentions into their moral judgements (Li et al., 
2020; Li & Tomasello, 2018). Given that the minds of others are invisible, what are people’s 
judgements based off? Here, we first review two of the predominant answers to this question 
before positing our own. 
Viewing people as naïve scientists, the “theory-theory” theory of mind was one of the 
earliest dominant theories to provide insight into how people determine whether something 
was intentional (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). The theory-theory argues that people reason 
about the causes of others’ actions like naïve scientists—positing or recruiting abstract 
constructs (mental states) to understand the unobserved underlying causes of behavior and to 
predict how people will act in the future (Spaulding, 2018). For example, John may witness 
an officer cause a protestor harm and infer whether it was intentional by determining which 
possible combination of mental states (beliefs, desires, etc.) are most plausible for the 
observed behavior and whether the posited mental states satisfy the conditions of intentional 
action (Malle & Knobe, 1997).  
Recently, however, this view of person as naïve scientist has come under attack. 
Knobe (2003, 2010) has argued that people do not reason about intentions like rational, 
amoral scientists. Rather, moral considerations figure into whether people consider something 
intentional. Consequently, the relationship between intentionality judgements and moral 
judgements is bi-directional—intentionality judgements can influence judgements of praise 
and blame, and judgements of praise and blame can influence intentionality judgements. 
Consider the following case as an example: 
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The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board [(CEO)] and said, 
'We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will 
also harm the environment.' The chairman of the board answered, 'I don't care at all 
about harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let's start 
the new program.' They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was 
harmed” (Knobe, 2003, p.191). 
Though it could plausibly be viewed as an unintentional side-effect of trying to make 
profit, when people were presented with this scenario 82% said that the chairman/CEO 
intentionally harmed the environment. When the word harm is replaced with help, however, 
only 23% of people said the chairman intentionally helped the environment. This 
phenomenon in which people typically judge harmful side-effects as more intentional than 
similarly helpful side-effects is known as the side-effect effect (Sauer, 2014) and is often 
used in support of the view that morality biases or influences intentionality judgements 
(Cushman & Mele, 2008; Nadelhoffer, 2004, 2006; Pettit and Knobe, 2009; Sauer & Bates, 
2013). On this view, people judge whether something was caused intentionally based 
partially on the moral goodness/badness of the outcome.  
The view that morality biases or influences intentionality has also come under great 
criticism, both on theoretical and methodological grounds (Cova et al., 2016; Guglielmo & 
Malle, 2010; Hindriks, 2014; Holton, 2010; Laurent et al., 2015; Machery, 2008; Uttich & 
Lombrozo, 2010). We join the critics in arguing that it is not morality per-say that is 
influencing people’s judgements of intentionality. Rather, we argue that people are using 
social information, particularly information about the perceived justifiability of the harm, to 
infer whether it was intentional. In the following section we outline our reasons for this claim 
by drawing on insights from signaling theory.  
Signaling Theory, Social Information, and Justifiability  
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Signaling theory is oriented around how certain behaviors of organisms can reduce 
information asymmetry (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973). That is, if I know something 
you do not, how my behaviors can show what I know. There are thus three main parts of 
signaling theory—the signaler, the signal, and the receiver. Most research on signaling theory 
focuses on how signalers intentionally communicate (signal) positive, imperceptible qualities 
of themselves to others (receivers) (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015; Karasek & Bryant, 2012; Moss 
et al. 2015). By comparison, in the cases we are interested in, a person signaling that they 
have purposefully caused harm is not a positive quality for them to communicate. Moreover, 
we also think that the way a person is signaling they have intentionally caused harm is not 
something they are necessarily doing on purpose. Thus, we are not using signaling theory to 
understand how a person might intentionally signal imperceptible positive aspects of 
themselves, but rather how a receiver might detect signals of others’ negative unobservable 
aspects through unintended side-effects of their actions. Understood in this way, we argue 
that inferring whether a person intentionally caused harm can be conceptualized within a 
signaling framework: the minds of others are invisible, so in order to discern whether 
someone intentionally caused harm people look at the signals provided by the agent’s actions 
within the social context. 
There are many challenges associated with relying on signals, however, as they can 
vary in their reliability; while some may provide accurate information about the individual’s 
unobservable features (e.g., their mental states) and reduce information asymmetry, others are 
red herrings—their function is to mislead others (e.g., mass and fighting ability are not 
reliably correlated, yet some species can bluff their way out of a fight by appearing bigger 
and reap undue rewards, Backwell et al., 2000). Using signals to determine whether 
something was intentional is thus no straightforward task—people must be careful what 
signals they base their judgements off. 
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Costly signaling (Bird & Smith, 2005; Grafen, 1990; Zahavi, 1975), however, 
provides a solution to the problem of deception and greatly simplifies this task by indicating 
what signals people should pay attention to. At its core, costly signaling states that if the costs 
of signaling the non-directly observable information are high enough that falsification is not 
worth it, then the signal becomes reliable. The organism detecting the signal can thus have a 
high credence that the signal is conveying accurate information. A classic example of this is 
stotting: A gazelle jumping straight high up into the air upon noticing a predator. The costs of 
stotting are high enough such that weak, unhealthy gazelle cannot do it. Thus, stotting 
provides a reliable signal to the predator that the gazelle is healthy and not worth chasing. 
This classic example, however, like most research on signaling, is focused on how something 
may intentionally communicate a positive, imperceptible quality of itself. By contrast, an 
example of costly signaling in the way we apply it is Jerrod Murray: Jerrod Murray confessed 
to murdering fellow student Generro Sanchez on the 6th of December 2017 simply because he 
wanted to know how it would feel (Knittle, 2017, December 17). The costs of murdering 
someone simply to know how it feels are high enough that people without callous-
unemotional traits do not do it. Thus, murder for the sake of wanting to know how it feels 
provides a reliable signal that the person is callous and unemotional. We therefore extend the 
idea that inferences of imperceptible information based on costs are more reliable to negative 
judgements of others’ intentions: when people are trying to infer whether others intentionally 
caused harm they reasonably give extra weight to signals associated with the person incurring 
a cost. 
Psychologists have already applied signaling theory to a range of mental state and 
trait inferences. Most notably, inferences of altruistic motives and traits (Hardy & Van Vugt, 
2006; Ogunfowora et al., 2018; Van Vugt & Hardy, 2010), sincerity (Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 
2009), and whether the person has traits of a high quality (Spence, 1973; Murphy, 2019; Park 
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et al., 2019). What we propose that is novel, is that many key findings in the attribution 
literature can be conceived of as people basing their judgements off social information that 
signals whether others caused harm intentionally. 
The concept of social information is broad, it refers to the reduction of uncertainty 
that can occur through observing an organism’s behavior in a social context. That is, how 
knowing the social norms etc. that a person is acting within can provide others with insight 
that reduces uncertainty about the underlying motives etc. they may have behind their actions 
(Detweiler, 1975). Social information can thus come in a variety of forms (Guglielmo, 2015) 
and provide numerous different signals that observers can detect. For example, a person’s 
willingness to violate social or moral norms can signal counter-normative mental states 
(Holton, 2010; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010); simply causing harm can signal the person knew 
harm would occur (Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010; Beebe & Jensen, 2012; Nakamura, 2018); a 
person who does not care about a morally relevant effect of their actions can signal they are 
especially blameworthy (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Hindriks et al., 2016); a person’s bad 
character can signal they are likely to cause harm (Phelan & Sarkissian 2008; Pizarro & 
Tannenbaum 2012; Uhlmann et al., 2015); and a willingness to make certain trade-off can 
signal intentions (Machery, 2008).  
The Trade-off Justification Model (TJM) (Rowe et al., 2020; Vonasch & Baumeister, 
2017) argues that the unjustifiability of causing the harm is a particularly important piece of 
social information—unjustified harming is a clear signal that the harm was intentional. 
Arguably all actions cause some harmful side-effects—police speeding to a crime 
scene emit harmful emissions, for example. However, according to TJM people would think 
that that side-effect was unintentional because the benefits of driving to the crime scene 
greatly outweigh the minor environmental costs—the harm was so minor that the police 
officer probably did not even consider it when deciding to race off to the crime scene. 
UNJUSTIFIED HARMING SIGNALS HARM WAS INTENTIONAL                          9 
 
Contrast this with situations where the costs greatly exceed the benefits. Costly, severe, and 
salient harms are such important pieces of social information that it is unlikely a person did 
not consider it in their decision making process—for example, an ambulance worker deciding 
which of two lives to save after an accident, one of whom is their child, cannot avoid 
considering that treating the stranger first may result in the death of their child. That someone 
considered the harms and knew they were making such a trade-off, however, is not sufficient 
to infer intentionally, for, as Thomas Aquinas famously argued, people can knowingly cause 
others’ deaths yet still not be judged as intending it (Aquinas, 13th c, II-II, Qu. 64, Art.7; 
Phelan & Sarkissian, 2009). This is where justifiability is key: If the reasons for causing the 
harm do not justify the costs, then it signals that the person considered/knew that harm would 
occur, had no justifiable reason for causing it, yet decided to cause it anyway. Consequently, 
signaling that the harm was intentional—the costs of causing the harm are high enough (i.e., 
costs > benefits) that people without harmful intentions would not do it. In contrast, when the 
harm was caused justifiably there is a lot more noise associated with the signal: if the reason 
for causing the harm outweighs the costs then the person still likely knew that harm would 
occur, but uncertainty remains about whether the person intended the harm or did it because 
of the benefits. Thus, in stark contrast to Machery’s trade-off model (2008), the Trade-off 
Justification Model reasons that not all costs will be judged intentional—only unjustified 
ones.  
In summary, how people determine whether someone caused harm intentionally can 
be conceptualized within a signaling framework: people use the signal provided by the person 
causing harm without justifying benefit to determine whether it was intentional—if the 
reasons for causing the harm do not justify the costs then it signals that the harm was 
intentional. The core claim of TJM is therefore that unjustified harms will be judged 
intentional but not justified ones. 
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Evidence Supporting TJM 
The previous section outlined the theoretical basis of TJM. This section reviews 
existing evidence supporting it.  
Both direct and indirect tests of TJM have lent support for the model’s core claim. 
Two studies have directly tested the model’s claim; Vonasch and Baumeister (2017) tested 
the claim that taboo trade-offs (i.e., trade-offs between sacred and non-sacred goods, or 
between things that are assigned infinite value and things that are not—e.g., love and money; 
Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000) would be judged as highly intentional due being highly 
unjustified. They found strong support for their claim with 95% of people judging that the 
harmful side-effect resulting from the taboo trade-off was intentional (Experiment 1). Rowe 
et al., (2020) tested the claim that the role a person occupies can increase or decrease 
perceptions that harm was intentional due to how it decreases or increases the justifiability of 
the role occupant’s actions. They also found strong support for their claim: when occupying a 
role made the harm less justifiable it was judged more intentional (Experiments 1 and 2). 
Conversely, when occupying a role made the harm more justifiable it was judged less 
intentional (Experiment 3). While the number of studies directly testing TJM are few, their 
results are clear: justifiability matters. 
Although only two studies have intentionally manipulated the justifiability of the 
harm, there are many cases which have unintentionally altered it as a side-effect of changing 
another variable (e.g., Mele & Cushman’s pond case, 2007; Phelan & Sarkissian’s city 
planner case, 2008). One of the best pieces of evidence for TJM comes from one such 
incidental manipulation by Phelan and Sarkissian (2009). Directly supporting TJM, their 
results showed that the relationship between the stated main goal and the harmful side-effect 
greatly affected judgements of whether the harmful side-effect was perceived as intentional: 
when the main goal (taking a hill for fun in a battle) did not justify the harmful side-effect 
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(soldiers dying), people typically judged the harm as intentional (73.5% of people judged it as 
intentional when averaging across variations 2&4). However, when the main goal (taking an 
important hill in a battle) meant the lieutenant was more justified in causing the harmful side-
effect, people were far less likely to judge it as intentional (47.5% of people judged it as 
intentional when averaging across variations 1&3). Contrast this large change (a 26% 
difference across conditions) in attributions caused by increasing the justifiability of the 
harm, with the minor change in attributions caused by varying the lieutenant’s words: 
whether the lieutenant said they did or did not care about their soldiers’ lives hardly caused 
any change (only a 5% difference across conditions).  
In summary, TJM’s core claim that unjustified harms, but not justified harms, are 
judged intentional is supported by both direct and indirect tests.  
Extending the Model 
The current state of the evidence supporting TJM and its answer for the question 
motivating this research (how do people determine whether someone caused harm 
intentionally?) is dissatisfactory for two notable reasons.  
 Firstly, while the studies reviewed indicate the validity of the model, they are also 
limited—the populations sampled WEIRD (Henrich, et al., 2010), the designs restricted (all 
studies used only between-subjects designs), and the scenarios utilized constrained (e.g., in 
Rowe et al., 2020 the scenarios involved harms comparatively minor to the typical ones 
researchers use, and none of the previous studies looked at whether the mechanism for 
attributing harmful intentions to groups is the same). 
Secondly, the model states that people determine whether harm was intentional by 
looking at whether the harm was justified, but how are people determining whether the harm 
is justified? There are many possible ways, all consistent with TJM. For instance, the 
observer may judge whether the harm was justified from the agent’s perspective (i.e., the 
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observer uses the agent’s beliefs to judge whether the harm was justified). The observer may 
also judge whether the harm was justified within the social context (i.e., using the provided 
social information to judge whether the harm was justified from the perspective of the society 
in which the actor is acting, or, to borrow Hume’s phrase, “the common point of view”; 1740, 
T 3.3.1.30). Judgements of justifiability could also be made from the observer’s own 
perspective (i.e., the observer uses their own beliefs to judge whether the harm was justified 
to them). Thus, in the paradigmatic CEO case, a person could (1) judge whether the CEO was 
justified in causing harm from the CEO’s perspective—was the harm justified in the CEO’s 
mind? (2) from the common point of view—was the harm justified within the immediate 
social context? or (3) from their own perspective—was the harm justified to the observer? 
Based on which perspective is taken, different judgements of whether the harm is justified, 
and consequently judged intentional, could be made.  
Supporting the view that observers are judging the justifiability of harms from their 
own perspective are the growing number of experiments in the literature documenting the 
existence of observer effects—or the effect of the judge’s beliefs, traits, and background on 
attributions of intentions (e.g., Cokely & Feltz; 2009; Liao et al., 2018; Robbins et al., 2017; 
Voiklis & Nickerson, 2012). For example, Tannenbaum et al., (2007) showed that people’s 
moral values track judgements of intentionality; people who valued the environment more 
were more likely to say that the CEO intentionally harmed it (80% of people who valued 
protecting the environment judged the harm as intentional, whereas only 63% of people who 
did not value protecting the environment judged it as intentional).  Investigating how certain 
aspects of observers may affect their perceptions of the justifiability of a harm (and 
consequently whether they judge it intentional) has the potential to deepen our understanding 
of the most interesting aspects of Mr. Gugino’s example—why people observed the exact 
same situation yet disagreed whether the harm was intentional.  
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Current Research 
The previous section highlighted two points of dissatisfaction for the answer provided 
to the question “how do people determine whether someone caused harm intentionally?” The 
current research is thus two-fold. Firstly, we further and more rigorously investigated the link 
between justifiability and intentionality by using a variety of scenarios, populations, and 
complementary experimental designs that address the limitations previously highlighted 
(Experiments 1-4). Secondly, we investigated how the dispositional beliefs of observers may 
affect their perceptions of the justifiability of a harm, leading some people to judge a harm as 
more intentional than others despite everyone being given the same information (Experiments 
5-6). 
More specifically, Experiment 1 tests the generalizability of the model by giving 
people a wide range of scenarios and assessing the relationship between justifiability and 
intentionality across the 19 scenarios. Experiments 2a-3b compliment Experiment 1 in two 
ways. Firstly, while Experiment 1 tests the generalizability of the model across situations, 
Experiments 2a-3b tests the cultural generalizability of the model by sampling from 4 
different countries. Secondly, while Experiment 1 is correlational in design, Experiments 2a-
3b experimentally manipulate the justifiability of causing harm by varying either the amount 
of costs or the amount of benefits in the trade-off. Experiment 4 compliments the previous 
experiments by testing whether people incorporate new justifying information and change 
their judgements about whether a person intentionally caused harm. Finally, in Experiments 5 
and 6 we investigated whether the cultural or group norms and values an observer has 
internalized affect the perceived justifiability of a harm and, consequently, the perceived 
intentionality of the harm. 
In an effort to promote open, robust science and avoid abusing researchers’ degrees of 
freedom, all experiments were preregistered, include a discussion of power/sample size 
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where relevant, and have the anonymized data posted online 
(https://osf.io/u9sp6/?view_only=9cb9b9749dae4a34a72e27ae083c5d50). The cultural 
generalizability of psychological studies has also been limited for years by being tested on 
WEIRD populations (Henrich, et al., 2010). With the rise of popular crowdsourcing platforms 
such as Mechanical Turk and Prolific allowing easy collection of data from people across the 
world, such a limitation is no longer justified. Here we have taken care to test the cultural 
generalizability of our findings by sampling people from 6 different countries (UK, US, SA, 
NZ, Poland, and China). Overall, the results support TJM’s core hypothesis that people’s 
judgements of whether others intentionally caused harm tracks the perceived justifiability of 
the harm and that this is true across a variety of scenarios and cultures. Results also support 
extensions of the model based on how aspects of the observer can affect the perceived 
justifiability, and, consequently, the intentionality of the harm.  
The materials for all experiments were approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Canterbury (HEC#2019/02). 
Experiment 1 
Causing harm without justified reason has been claimed to signal that the harm was 
intentional. Experiment 1 aimed to test the generalizability of this hypothesized relationship 
between justifiability and intentionality across a range of scenarios. Most of the vignettes in 
the literature have been restricted to a common situation about a CEO (or person of 
equivalent status) who implements some sort of program that has a harmful side-effect. By 
using a wide range of scenarios—scenarios where the focus of the attribution is about a 
political group or movement, for example—we can test whether the hypothesized mechanism 
applies in numerous contexts. 
Method 
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Preregistration https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=zc4jx6Procedure   
Procedure  
Participants read 19 different vignettes, presented in random order, about agents who 
caused harm. After reading each vignette, participants answered questions about whether they 
thought the harm was intentional and whether they thought the harm was justified. The harm, 
the agent who caused the harm, as well as the justifiability of causing harm are varied 
throughout the vignettes (see example below, all vignettes are available in Appendix A). We 
took care to ensure that the harms were those people would typically agree were unjustified, 
somewhat justified, or completely unjustified as we are interested in testing the effects at the 
vignette level first before moving on to test the effects of justifiability at the individual level 
later.  
Participants 
40 undergraduate psychology students from Appalachian State University were 
requested to participate in this study for course credit. Due to a technological error, the 
system sent through 49 participants. Eight were excluded for failing an attention check, 
leaving a final sample of 41 participants (Mage = 19.0, SD = 1.98). The majority were female 
(33 Female, 7 Male, 1 Gender diverse) and white (87.8% White, 7.3% Black). 
Measures  
Perceived intentions and justifiability were measured on a 7-point Likert scale where 
1 = Definitely Not, 4 = Maybe, and 7 = Definitely Yes.  
Example Measure of Perceived Justifiability. “Were the supporters justified in 
ending slavery?” 
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Example Measure of Intentions to Harm. “Did the supporters intentionally harm 
the economy?”  
Attention Check. In online studies (particularly those using popular crowd sourcing 
platforms), bots and inattentive participants can be a major issue. To avoid this issue, we 
included an open-ended question as an attention check (“In one to two sentences, please 
explain why you thought the CEO's decision was/was not justified.”) in all our studies to 
screen out bots and inattentive participants (Chmielewski & Kucker, 2020). Participants were 
excluded if their open-ended responses did not answer the question—e.g., “was the business 
there first?” was excluded. 
Example Vignette 
The abolitionist movement in Laputa was aimed at ending slavery in the country. 
However, supporters of this movement also knew that ending slavery would have 
negative effects on the economy. The movement was successful and, sure enough, 
there were negative effects on the country's economy.  
Results 
Analytic Plan  
We had observations for 19 different scenarios and were interested in investigating 
whether the effect of justifying social information was similar across scenarios (rather than 
individuals). Thus, we used linear mixed models in Jamovi (clustering by vignette and 
including random slopes and intercepts for each vignette) to estimate the effect of justifying 
social information on intentions at the vignette level. 
Key Results 
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Perceived Justifiability Predicts Intention judgements. As predicted, perceived 
unjustifiability predicts attributions of harmful intentions, F(1, 18.3) = 17.7, p < .001: Harms 
that were judged as more unjustified were judged as more intentionally caused (B = -0.23, 
95%CI:[-.33, -.12], t(18.3) = - 4.20, p < .001, R2conditional = .22). The relationship between 
perceived justifiability and attributions of harmful intentions showed slight variation in 
intercepts (SD = 0.69, Var = 0.48) and slopes (SD = 0.15, Var = 0.02) across vignettes, 
indicating that the effect of perceived justifiability on intention judgements was slightly 
different across scenarios (i.e., in some scenarios the effect of justifiability on intention 
judgements was slightly stronger).  
Visual analysis of mean justifiability and intentionality responses also support the 
hypothesized negative association by showing a clear trend that in vignettes where the harm 
is judged to be less justified, the harm is perceived as more intentional (Figure 1, Table 1). 
Figure 1  
Line Graph showing the Negative Association between Mean Intentionality and Mean 
Justifiability Responses across the Series of Vignettes in Experiment 1, Organized from Low 
to High Justifiability 
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Table 1  
Means (and standard deviations) in Experiment 1, Split by Vignette and Organized from Low 
to High Justifiability 
Vignette Justifiability Intentionality 
Curtis (8) 1.61(1.18) 5.93(1.35) 
Chairman (19) 1.66(0.94) 6.49(0.84) 
Jacob (4) 1.68(1.29) 4.34(1.65) 
A Party (6) 1.85(1.24) 4.98(1.70) 
Mary (11) 1.88(1.10) 5.12(1.68) 
President Developed Country (14) 2.05(1.34) 5.39(1.41) 
Josh (17) 2.10(1.50) 4.83(2.06) 
Mark (16) 2.71(1.57) 4.32(1.90) 
President Developing Country (13) 3.71(1.81) 5.24(1.41) 
Russell (5) 3.78(1.56) 3.98(1.57) 
Jane (12) 4.00(1.64) 3.59(1.84) 
Eugene (7) 4.85(1.62) 4.68(1.72) 
Affirmative Action (10) 5.00(1.87) 3.80(2.03) 
Mark (2) 5.05(1.43) 4.85(1.93) 
Jim (3) 5.63(1.44) 4.76(2.34) 
Sally (1) 5.71(1.12) 4.10(2.27) 
Frank (18) 6.32(1.21) 3.39(2.04) 
Jo (15) 6.41(1.05) 2.32(1.51) 
Abolitionists (9) 6.63(1.04) 2.68(1.60) 
Note. The order of the vignettes was randomized. The numbers next to the name of each vignette are 
simply to aid in identifying each vignette (available in the appendix). 
  
Exploratory Analyses 
We were also interested in testing individual differences, i.e., whether the effect of 
perceived justifiability on intention judgements is consistent across participants. To test this 
we conducted another linear mixed model in Jamovi (clustering by participant and including 
random slopes and intercepts for each participant) to estimate the effect of justifying social 
information on intentions at the participant level. As expected, perceived justifiability 
predicted attributions of harmful intentions at the participant level, F(1, 40.4) = 114, p < .001: 
The harms that people judged as more unjustified were judged as more intentionally caused 
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(B = -0.36, 95%CI:[-.42, -.29], t(40.4) = - 10.7, p < .001, R2conditional = .39). The relationship 
between perceived justifiability and attributions of harmful intentions showed some variation 
in intercepts (SD = 0.95, Var = 0.90) and some variation in slopes (SD = 0.13, Var = 0.02) 
across participants. We interpret the variation in intercepts and slopes as meaning that some 
people are less responsive to justifying social information than others and that some people 
require the harm to be more justified before they consider it as not intentional. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that the general relationship between justifiability and 
intentionality was as predicted: people tended to judge less justified harms as more 
intentional (Figure 1). Moreover, this trend emerged at both the vignette level and individual 
level: harms that people tend to see as unjustified are the ones that people tend to judge 
intentional. Also, individuals who tended to see harm as less justified in general tended to 
judge harm as more intentional.  
Experiment 1 supports the generalizability of TJM across various contexts, addressing 
one of the limitations of previous tests of the model. However, no tightly controlled 
manipulations took place—while the scenarios were designed to vary in their justifiability, 
there were also other things that varied between them (such as whether the attribution was 
made at a group or an individual). While we suspect the other variations did not drive the 
trend, more controlled experiments need to be done to be certain. Thus, Experiments 2a-3b 
set out to isolate the manipulation of one variable (justifiability) and test (and replicate) the 
effects of this manipulation across cultures.  
Experiment 2a 
Experiment 1 verified that justifiability and intentionality were linked across a wide 
range of scenarios. Experiment 2a aimed to provide a more controlled test by manipulating 
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only one variable—the justifiability of the CEO running their program. We manipulated the 
justifiability of causing the harm by varying how much profit a CEO made as a result of 
running a program. However, we could not use the harm in the original CEO vignette 
(environmental destruction) because it is taboo and no increase in profit can justify a taboo 
trade-off (Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000; Vonasch & Baumeister, 2017). Thus, we 
changed the harm to something comparatively minor—the CEO annoying their neighbors by 
expanding their building and blocking their view. We predicted in scenarios where the 
program made more profit people would judge the decision to run the program as more 
justified and perceive the harmful side-effect (annoying the neighbors) as less intentional. 
Moreover, we predicted that the relationship between the amount of profit and perceived 
harmful intentions would be mediated by the perceived justifiability of running the program. 
Specifically, we predicted that when the CEO’s company made more profit people would 
judge the decision as more justified, and that people who thought the decision was more 
justified would judge the harm as less intentional.  
This Experiment also included an exploratory component: we wanted to begin 
investigating how observers are judging the justifiability of the harm. Based on previous 
research demonstrating observer effects (the effect of the judge’s beliefs, traits, and 
background on attributions of intentions; see, for example Tannenbaum et al., 2007), we 
hypothesized that observers’ perceptions of whether the act was morally wrong impacts 
intentionality judgements via its effect on the perceived justifiability of the harm. We 
predicted that, as immoral actions are by their nature hard to justify, observers who view the 
decision as morally wrong will be more likely to judge it as unjustified, and, therefore, as 
more intentional. 
Method 
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Preregistration https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=4gk9qa  
Procedure 
Participants read one of three randomly assigned vignettes (see below) and then 
answered questions about the justifiability of the CEO’s decision, the CEO’s intentions, the 
moral wrongness of the CEO’s actions, and an attention check. The order of the justifiability 
and intention questions were randomized to avoid possible order effects (none were found). 
Participants then completed demographics (gender, age, race) and were debriefed. 
Participants 
As preregistered, we requested 300 UK participants from Prolific per power analyses 
indicating 250 participants are required for sufficient power (95%) to detect a medium effect 
size in a one-way ANOVA (the average effect size in social psychology). We oversampled to 
account for potential exclusions/drop-out. Prolific sent 317 participants. 18 participants were 
excluded for failing an attention check, leaving a final sample of 299 participants (194 
Female, 102 Male, 3 declined to state) (Mage = 36.9, SD = 11.5).  
Measures 
The measures of intentionality and justifiability were the same as in the previous 
experiment, but with slight changes in wording to fit the vignette (e.g., “Was the CEO’s 
decision justified?”, “Did the CEO annoy the neighbours on purpose?”). 
This experiment also included two new measures—moral wrongness (measured via a 
dichotomous yes/no response) and intentionality attributions for concrete behaviors 
(measured on the same 7-point Likert scale as perceived justifiability and harmful intentions). 
Moral Wrongness. “Were the CEO's actions morally wrong?” 
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Intentionality Attributions for ‘Concrete’ Behaviors. Whereas attributions of 
abstract ‘high level’ behaviors (e.g., intentionally causing harm) have been shown to be 
affected by social information, attributions of concrete ‘low-level’ behaviors (e.g., picking up 
a pen) have been shown to be unaffected by social information (Monroe et al., 2015). We 
thus included a measure of intentionality for concrete behaviors (“Did the CEO run the 
program on purpose?”) to highlight the difference between the types of attributions that are 
affected by social information and those that are not. 
Vignette 
“The vice-president of a company went to the CEO and said, “We are thinking of 
hiring more staff and expanding our office building by increasing it 3 stories. It will 
help us increase profits by fifty pounds/fifty thousand pounds/five million pounds 
per year, but it will also really annoy the neighbors by blocking their view.” 
The CEO decided to run the program. Sure enough, the neighbors view was blocked 
and they were really annoyed.” 
Results 
Key Results 
Perceived Justifiability of the Decision. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA revealed 
a significant main effect of profit on the perceived justifiability of the CEO’s decision, 
F(2,296) = 23.3, p < .001, η2 = .136). Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons showed that 
the change in means was as we predicted: when the program’s profit was low (M = 2.70, SD 
= 1.56) people judged the CEO’s decision as less justified than when the profit was moderate 
(M = 3.73, SD = 1.34), t(296) = 4.78, pbonferroni < .001, d = 0.27, or when the profit was high 
(M = 4.14, SD = 1.65), t(296) = 6.64, pbonferroni < .001, d = 0.38 (Figure 2). Though not 
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significantly different (pbonferroni = .162) the pattern of means for moderate compared to high 
are in the predicted direction (High < Moderate) (Table 2).  
Figure 2  
Mean Perceived Justifiability and Intentionality Responses in Experiment 2a by Condition 
 
Note. Perceived intentions and justifiability were measured on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 
= Definitely Not, 4 = Maybe, and 7 = Definitely Yes. Error Bars = 95% CI 
 
Table 2  
Means (and standard deviations) in Experiment 2a by Condition 
 Low profit Moderate profit High profit 
Perceived Justifiability 2.70(1.56)a 3.73(1.34)b 4.14(1.65)b 
Intentionally Harm 4.33(2.05)a 4.05(1.93)ab 3.65(1.77)b 
Intentionally run programme 5.37(1.83)a 5.34(1.88)a 5.49(1.70)a 
Note. In rows, means with different superscripts are significantly different (p < .05). 
Differences in means were tested using Bonferroni corrected planned comparisons.  
 
Perceived Intentions to Harm. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of profit on peoples’ judgements of the CEO’s intentions to annoy the 
neighbors, F(2,296) = 3.14, p = .045, η2 = .021). Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons 
revealed that the change in means was as predicted: When the program’s profit was low 
people perceived the harm as more intentional than when the program’s profit was high, 
t(296) = -2.49, pbonferroni = .040, d = 0.14 (Table 2, Figure 2). Again, whilst not significantly 
UNJUSTIFIED HARMING SIGNALS HARM WAS INTENTIONAL                          24 
 
different, the patterns of means for moderate compared to large (pbonferroni = .414) and small 
compared to a moderate amount (pbonferroni = .905) is in the predicted direction (High < 
Moderate < Low).  
The differences in perceived intention to harm in low vs high profit reflect the 
perceived differences in the justifiability of the CEO’s decision: in the condition where the 
decision was viewed as most justified, the harm was seen as the least intentional. 
Incongruently, despite there being a significant difference in the perceived justifiability of the 
CEO’s decision between the low and moderate profit conditions, there was not a significant 
difference in perceived intentions to harm. However, despite not all being significantly 
different from one another, the group means are presenting in a linear fashion as predicted 
(High < Moderate < Low, Table 2). Indeed, exploratory follow up analyses revealed a 
significant linear trend B = 0.48, 95%CI:[0.10, 0.87], t(296) = 2.49 , p = .013). Showing that 
as the profit became lower, people were more likely to judge the harm as intentional. 
Furthermore, strongly supporting TJM, the results show a consistent pattern across 
conditions that participants who thought the decision was unjustified thought the harm was 
intentional, whereas those who thought the decision was justified thought the harm was not 
intentional (Figure 3). Indeed, a linear regression showed a strong negative relationship 
between perceived justifiability and perceived harmful intentions, B = -.55, 95%CI:[-.67, -
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Figure 3  
Mean Attributions of Harmful Intentions in Experiment 2a, Split by High/Low Perceived 
Justifiability of the CEO’s Decision 
 
Perceived Intentions to Run the Program. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA 
showed that how much profit the program made had no effect on perceptions of the CEO’s 
intentions to run the program, F(2,296) = 0.206, p = .814, η2 = .001) (Table 2). A linear 
regression also supports this by showing that the perceived justifiability of the CEO’s 
decision does not predict perceived intentions to run the program, B = -0.10, 95%CI:[ -0.23, 
0.02], t(297) = -1.62 , p = .106). Thus, consistent with previous research, judgements of 
intentions to do concrete actions (e.g., run a program) were much less reactive to social 
information than judgements of intentions to cause abstract outcomes (e.g., annoy the 
neighbors). 
Pathway from Profit to Perceived Intentions to Harm via Perceived 
Justifiability. Mediation using the MEDMOD package in JAMOVI and 5000 bootstrap 
samples revealed that increases in the profit the program made was associated with decreased 
perceived intentions to harm (annoy the neighbors) and that an increase in the perceived 
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A: B = 0.72*** 
SE = .11 
B: B = -.56*** 
SE = .07 
 
 
C: B = -.34* 
SE = .17 
 C': B = -.06 
SE = .13 
 
justifiability of the CEO’s decision mediated this link (indirect effect: -0.40, 95%CI:[-0.56, -
0.23], SE = 0.08, p < .001; Figure 4). Increase in profit was associated with increased 
perceptions that the CEO’s decision was justified (B = 0.72, 95%CI:[0.50, 0.94], SE = 0.11, p 
< .001). An increase in the perceived justifiability of the CEO’s decision was associated with 
a decrease in perceptions that the CEO intentionally annoyed the neighbors (B = -0.56, 
95%CI:[-0.67, -0.42], SE = 0.07, p < .001). The remaining direct effect was not significant (B 
= -0.06, 95%CI:[-0.20, 0.32], SE = 0.13, p = .664) indicating that the effect was fully 
mediated. Mediation analyses thus support the hypothesis that it is how the increase in profit 
affected the perceived justifiability of causing harm that mattered for intention judgements, 
not something about profit in itself. However, a qualification is warranted here: When 
mediators are measured at the same time as dependent variables, mediation cannot establish 













Pathway from Perceived Moral Wrongness to Perceived Harmful Intentions via 
Perceived Justifiability. We hypothesized that observer’s perceptions of whether the act was 
morally wrong would impact intentionality judgements via its effect on the perceived 
Figure 4  
Mediation Model Depicting the Pathway from Increased Profit levels to Reduced Perceived 
Intentions to Harm via Increased Perceived Justifiability in Experiment 2a 
Justifiability 
Intentions Profit 
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justifiability of the harm. An exploratory mediation analysis supported this hypothesis: 
Observer’s judgements that the CEO’s actions were morally wrong was associated with 
increased perceived harmful intentions and perceived justifiability of the CEO’s decision 
mediated this link (indirect effect: 0.82, 95%CI:[.49, 1.14], SE = 0.18, p < .001).   
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 2a strongly support TJM’s hypothesis that people’s 
judgements of others’ harmful intentions track the social information available: People who 
thought the harm was unjustified judged it as intentional, whereas people who thought the 
harm was justified judged it as not intentional (Figure 3). Moreover, as the profit became 
lower people judged the harm as more unjustified and more intentional (Table 2). Experiment 
2a also highlights the limitations social information has on certain types of attributions—
whereas social information is highly influential in whether abstract behaviors are judged 
intentional, it has no effect on whether concrete behaviors are judged intentional. 
Experiment 2a also provided preliminary evidence for how observers judge whether 
the harm was justified: people who judged the harm as morally wrong judged it as more 
unjustified and, consequently, intentional. Thus, indicating that observers are, at least in part, 
judging the justifiability of the harm from their own perspective. Admittedly, however, this 
experiment was not ideally situated to test how observer’s judge the justifiability of the harm. 
Thus, in the following replication studies we dropped the moral wrongness measure and took 
a different approach in Experiments 5 and 6 by utilizing existing differences in people’s 
cultural backgrounds and political ideologies. 
Experiment 2a was more tightly controlled than Experiment 1. Here, only one 
variable (profit) changed between the vignettes. This subsequently affected people’s 
perceptions of the justifiability of running the program and, consequently, the intentions they 
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attributed to the CEO. Thus, it provides strong support for TJM’s core claim that justifiability 
affects intentionality judgements. However, it is just one study with one vignette on a 
WEIRD (Henrich et al., 2010) population. To test the generalizability of the findings we 
conducted another study using a culturally distinct population (South African compared to 
British). 
Experiment 2b 
Experiment 2b aimed to replicate and extend Experiment 2a by using a conceptually 
identical vignette and distinct population. Participants read a short vignette about a CEO who, 
through upgrading to an automated assembly line, made 3 workers redundant (retrenched). 
The CEO made various amounts of profit for upgrading, and, as in Experiment 2a we 
predicted that as the amount of profit increased that people would judge the CEO’s decision 
as more justified and the harm less intentional. Furthermore, that the relationship between the 





Apart from requesting South African participants, dropping the moral wrongness 
question, and using a different but conceptually identical vignette the procedure was identical 
to Experiment 2a. 
Participants 
We requested 300 South African participants from Prolific, and Prolific sent 313. 
Twenty seven were excluded for failing an attention check, leaving a final sample of 286 
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participants (Mage = 29.4, SD = 9.53); the majority of participants were female (161 Female, 
124 Male, 1 non-binary) and white (47.6% White, 29.0% Black, 8.7% Indian, 14.3% Other).  
Measures 
The measures were the same as in Experiment 2a but with slight changes in wording 
to fit the vignette (e.g., “Did the CEO intentionally make the 3 workers unemployed?”). 
Vignette 
“The vice-president of a company went to the CEO and said, “We are thinking of 
updating to a new automated assembly line. It will help us increase profits by 
500/700,000/2,000,000 Rand per year, but will cause 3 workers to be retrenched.” 




Perceived Justifiability of the Decision. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA revealed 
a significant main effect of profit on the perceived justifiability of the CEO’s decision, 
F(2,283) = 8.78, p < .001, η2 = .058). Also as predicted, a linear contrast showed a significant 
linear trend, B = -0.57, p < .001, indicating that as profit decreased, people become less likely 
to judge the decision as justified. However, a visual analysis of the means and Bonferroni 
corrected follow up comparisons qualify this result (Figure 5, Table 3). Most notably, the 
average perceived justifiability in the high profit group (M = 4.80, SD = 1.57) was not greater 
than the moderate profit group (M = 4.97, SD = 1.47, t(283) = -0.52, pbonferroni = 1.00). 
                                                            
1 To ensure the vignette was written in the culturally appropriate vernacular we consulted with one of the 
authors South African friends. 
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Though, as expected, the average perceived justifiability in the moderate profit group was 
higher compared to the low profit group (M = 4.05, SD = 1.88, t(283) = 3.35, pbonferroni = .003, 
d = 0.56).  
Table 3  
Means (and standard deviations) in Experiment 2b, Split by Condition 
 
Low Profit Moderate Profit High Profit 
Perceived Justifiability 4.05(1.89)a 4.98(1.49)b 4.85(1.55)b 
Intentionally Harm 4.68(2.07)a 3.85(1.98)b 4.31(2.15)ab 
Intentionally Run Programme 5.52(1.91)a 5.32(2.04)a 5.50(1.91)a 
Note. In rows, means with different superscripts are significantly different (p < .05). 
Differences in means were tested using Bonferroni corrected planned comparisons.  
 
 
Figure 5  
Mean Perceived Justifiability and Intentionality Responses in Experiment 2b by Condition 
 
Note. Perceived intentions and justifiability were measured on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 
= Definitely Not, 4 = Maybe, and 7 = Definitely Yes. Error Bars = 95% CI 
Perceived Intentions to Harm. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of profit on peoples’ judgements of the CEO’s intentions to make the 
employees unemployed, F(2,283) = 3.85, p = .022, η2 = .026). However, contrary to 
predictions, a linear contrast revealed that there was no significant linear trend, B = 0.26, p = 
.216, rather, there was a significant quadratic trend, p = .014 (Figure 5). The reason for the 
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quadratic trend is presumably due to the manipulation not working as predicted: we expected 
that as the amount of profit increased that people would judge the CEO’s decision as more 
justified, but, although people did judge the CEO’s decision as more justified when the profit 
was moderate or high compared to low, people did not judge it as more justified when it was 
high compared to moderate (see section above). Though the manipulation did not work as 
expected, exploratory analyses indicate that TJM’s key prediction that people who judge a 
decision to cause harm as unjustified will judge the harm as intentional, whereas people who 
judge the decision as justified will judge the harm as not intentional is still supported: people 
who judged the CEO’s decision as definitely unjustified (i.e., reported justifiability of 1, N = 
20) judged the harm as intentional (M = 5.15, SD = 2.43), whereas people who thought the 
CEO’s decision was definitely justified (i.e., reported justifiability of 7, N = 44) judged the 
harm as not intentional (M = 3.64, SD = 2.26).  
Perceived Intentions to Run the Program. As in Experiment 2a, we predicted that 
judgements of intentions to do concrete actions (e.g., run a program) would be much less 
reactive to social information than judgements of intentions to cause abstract outcomes (e.g., 
cause employees to be retrenched). Consistent with Experiment 2a, a one-way ANOVA 
showed that how much profit the program made had no effect on perceptions of the CEO’s 
intentions to run the program, F(2,283) = 0.331, p = .719, η2 = .002).  
Pathway from Profit to Perceived Intentions to Harm via Perceived 
Justifiability. Mediation using the MEDMOD package in JAMOVI and 5000 bootstrap 
samples revealed that increases in the profit the program made was associated with decreased 
perceived intentions to make the 3 employees unemployed and that an increase in the 
perceived justifiability of the CEO’s decision mediated this link (indirect effect: -0.10, 
95%CI:[-0.19, -0.02], SE = 0.05, p = .022). Increase in profit was associated with increased 
perceptions that the CEO’s decision was justified (B = 0.40, 95%CI:[0.16, 0.65], SE = 0.12, p 
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= .001). An increase in the perceived justifiability of the CEO’s decision was associated with 
a decrease in perceptions that the CEO intentionally made the 3 employees unemployed (B = 
-0.26, 95%CI:[-0.41, -0.10], SE = 0.08, p = .001). The remaining direct effect was not 
significant (B = -0.08, 95%CI:[-0.38, 0.22], SE = 0.15, p = .593), indicating that the effect 
was fully mediated.  
Discussion 
The manipulation in Experiment 2b did not work as expected. We anticipated that as 
profit increased, the justifiability of the CEO’s decision would increase, but we did not find 
this pattern. Rather, an analysis of the open-ended responses to the attention check question 
(“In one to two sentences, please explain why you thought the CEO's decision was/was not 
justified.”) indicated an unanticipated split in people’s reasoning that we expect caused the 
manipulation to fail: some people argued that as profit increased the decision became less 
justifiable (e.g., “It is not ethical to retrench someone to increase the companies profits. With 
the extra money that they made he could have kept on the two employees and still make a 
profit”) – after all, if the company is going to make a lot more profit, what reason does the 
CEO have for making people redundant as opposed to restructuring their jobs? In contrast, 
others argued that as profits increased, the CEO’s decision became more justifiable (e.g., “In 
the end it is the CEO's responsibility to make sure the company is profitable. His decision, 
was in my opinion justified.”) – after all, it is the CEO’s role to make as much profit as 
possible, thus, the more profit the CEO’s decision makes, the more justified it is.  
The results still supported TJM despite the manipulation not working as intended. 
Experiment 2b showed the same key pattern of results as Experiment 2a but with a different 
vignette and culturally distinct sample: people who judged the decision to cause harm as 
unjustified judged the harm as intentional, whereas people who judged the decision as 
justified judged the harm as not intentional. Crucially, the hypothesized pathway between the 
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different conditions and intentionality judgements was also supported—it is how the increase 
in profit affected the perceived justifiability of causing harm that affected intentionality 
judgements. 
Experiment 3a 
Experiment 3a tested the effect of justifiability in a similar way to Experiment 2, only 
instead of varying the justifiability of the harm by changing the amount of profit, this time we 
varied the costs (harm) and kept profits the same. Participants read a short vignette describing 
an event in which the Chief of Operations makes various changes to a movie based on a 
book. The reason for making the changes is constant across conditions, however, the costs of 
making the decision varied across conditions. Depending on which condition the participants 
were assigned to, the Chief of Operations either made very small changes and annoyed very 
few fans (Low Cost), a moderate amount of changes and annoyed some fans (Moderate 
Cost), or a large amount of changes and annoyed almost all fans (High Cost). We predicted 
that as the costs increased, people would judge the Chief of Operations’ decision as less 
justified and perceive the harm as more intentional and, crucially, that the relationship 
between increased costs and increase harmful intentions would be mediated by reduced 
justifiability. 
Method 
Preregistration https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=cc2yh7  
Procedure 
Expect for recruiting American participants from Prolific, the procedure was the same 
as Experiment 2b.  
Participants  
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As preregistered, we requested 300 American participants from Prolific. Prolific sent 
329 and 43 were excluded for failing an attention check, leaving a total sample of 286 
participants (Mage = 30.6, SD = 10.10). As with both previous studies, the majority were 
female (141 Female, 134 Male, 11 Gender diverse) and white (65.4% White, 8.0% Black, 
16.8% Asian, 9.4% Other).  
Measures 
The measures were the same as in the previous experiment but with slight changes in 
wording to fit the vignette (e.g., “Did the Chief of Operations intentionally annoy the fans?”). 
Vignette 
A new film was being made based on a popular book. During the production, the vice 
production manager said to the Chief of Operations “We are thinking of making some 
changes to the film. It will slightly reduce production costs but cause the film to be a 
tiny bit different from the book, somewhat annoying a small number of the book's 
hard-core fans / It will reduce production costs but cause the film to be moderately 
different from the book, annoying some fans of the book / It will reduce production 
costs but cause the film to be majorly different from the book, seriously annoying 
almost all fans of the book. 
The Chief of Operations decided to make the changes. Sure enough, a small number 
of hard-core fans were somewhat annoyed by the changes/ some fans of the book 
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Perceived Justifiability of the Decision. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA revealed 
a significant main effect of cost on the perceived justifiability of the decision F(2,283) = 
14.5, p < .001, η2 = .093). Also as predicted, a linear contrast showed a significant linear 
trend, B = 0.70, p < .001, indicating that as the costs increased, people became less likely to 
judge the decision as justified (Figure 6, Table 4).  
 
Table 4  
Means (and standard deviations) in Experiment 3a, split by condition 
  Low Cost Moderate Cost High Cost 
Perceived justifiability 4.38(1.22)a 4.16(1.27)a 3.39(1.48)b 
Intentionally Harm 3.29(1.76)a 3.53(1.78)ab 4.12(1.86)b 
Intentionally make changes 5.83(1.36)a 6.00(1.30)a 5.98(1.55)a 
Note. In rows, means with different superscripts are significantly different (p < .05). 
Differences in means were tested using Bonferroni corrected planned comparisons.  
 
Figure 6  
Mean Perceived Justifiability and Intentionality Responses in Experiment 3a by Condition 
 
Note. Perceived intentions and justifiability were measured on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 
= Definitely Not, 4 = Maybe, and 7 = Definitely Yes. Error Bars = 95% CI 
Perceived Intentions to Harm. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of cost on peoples’ judgements of the Chief of Operation’s intentions 
to annoy the fans, F(2,283) = 5.42, p = .005, η2 = .037). Also as predicted, a linear contrast 
showed that there was a significant linear trend B = -0.59, p = .002, indicating that as the 
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A: B = -0.49*** 
SE = .01 
B: B = -.33*** 
SE = .08 
 
 
C: B = .42** 
SE = .13 
 C': B = .26 
SE = .13 
 
costs of the decision increased (i.e., amount of fans annoyed increased) people judged the 
harm as more intentional (Figure 6).  
Perceived Intentions to make the Changes. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA 
showed that how costly the decision was had no effect on perceptions of the Chief of 
Operations intentionally making the changes, F(2,283) = 0.417, p = .659, η2 = .003).  
Pathway from Profit to Perceived Intentions to Harm via Perceived 
Justifiability. Mediation using the MEDMOD package in JAMOVI and 5000 bootstrap 
samples revealed that increases in the costs of the Chief of Operations’ decisions was 
associated with increased perceived intentions to annoy the fans and that a decrease in the 
perceived justifiability of the decision mediated this link (indirect effect: 0.16, 95%CI:[0.05, 
0.27], SE = 0.06, p = .004; Figure 7). Increase in cost was associated with decreased 
perceptions that the decision was justified (B = -0.49, 95%CI:[-0.69, -0.30], SE = 0.10, p < 
.001). An increase in the perceived justifiability of the decision was associated with a 
decrease in perceptions that the Chief of Operations intentionally annoyed the fans (B = -
0.33, 95%CI:[-0.50, -0.15], SE = 0.09, p < .001). The remaining direct effect was slightly 
above the cut-off point (B = 0.26, 95%CI:[-0.01, 0.52], SE = 0.13, p = .055), indicating that 










Figure 7  
Mediation Model Depicting the Pathway from Increased Costs to Increased Perceived 
Intentions to Harm via Reduced Perceived Justifiability in Experiment 3a 
Justifiability 
Intentions Cost 
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Discussion 
Experiment 3a extended the results from the previous experiments by showing that 
information about the justifiability of a person’s decision—specifically its costs—influence 
people’s judgements of whether the harm resulting from the decision was intentional: people 
judged that the Chief of Operations intentionally annoyed fans of the book when they thought 
the decision was unjustified (i.e., the costs outweighed the benefits), but not when they 
thought the decision was justified (i.e., benefits outweighed costs). Experiment 3a thus 
provides further support for the hypothesis that people’s judgements of others’ intentions are 
sensitive to information that justifies their decision to cause harm.  
Experiment 3b 
Experiment 3b aimed to test the generalizability and replicability of Experiment 3a 
with a new, culturally distinct sample (Polish compared to American). All stimuli and 
predictions were the same as Experiment 3a.  
Method 
Preregistration https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=g6m3gf  
Procedure 
Expect for recruiting Polish nationals fluent in English from Prolific, the procedure 
was the same as Experiment 3a.  
Participants  
As preregistered, we requested 300 Polish participants fluent in English from Prolific. 
Prolific sent 325 and 50 were excluded for failing an attention check, leaving a total sample 
of 275 participants. In contrast to the previous study, the sample was an average 7 years 
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younger (Mage = 23.6, SD = 6.59), almost all participants identified as white (99.6% White, 
0.4% Black), and the majority were male (195 Male, 77 Female, 3 Gender diverse). 
Measures 
The measures were the same as the previous experiment.  
Vignette 
 The vignettes were the same as in Experiment 3a.2 
Results 
Key Results 
Perceived Justifiability of the Decision. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA revealed 
a significant main effect of cost on the perceived justifiability of the decision F(2,272) = 
5.83, p = .003, η2 = .041). Also as predicted, a linear contrast showed a significant linear 
trend, B = 0.48, p < .001, indicating that as the costs increased, people became less likely to 
judge the decision as justified (Figure 8, Table 5).  
 
Table 5  
Means (and standard deviations) in Experiment 3b, split by condition 
  Low Cost Moderate Cost High Cost 
Perceived justifiability 4.71(1.20)a 4.51(1.40)a 4.03(1.48)b 
Intentionally Harm 3.17(1.74) a 3.48(1.86) a 3.51(1.96) a 
Intentionally make changes 5.22(1.60) a 5.39(1.59) a 5.40(1.59) a 
Note. In rows, means with different superscripts are significantly different (p < .05). 
Differences in means were tested using Bonferroni corrected planned comparisons.  
                                                            
2 To ensure the vignette was appropriate for use with English speaking Polish nationals we consulted with one 
of the authors Polish friends.  
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Figure 8  
Mean Perceived Justifiability and Intentionality Responses in Experiment 3b by Condition 
 
 
Note. Perceived intentions and justifiability were measured on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 
= Definitely Not, 4 = Maybe, and 7 = Definitely Yes. Error Bars = 95% CI 
Perceived Intentions to Harm. Potentially due to the manipulation having a smaller 
effect on justifiability compared to the Experiment 3a (η2 = .041 vs η2 = .093, a difference of 
a small effect size, d = 0.23. More on this below.), we failed to detect an effect of cost on 
people’s judgements of the Chief of Operations intentions to annoy the fans, F(2,272) = 
0.938, p = .393, η2 = .007). Critically, the number of people recruited was based on the 
medium effect sizes detected in previous experiments, and, given the weaker effect of the 
manipulation on perceived justifiability, the reason we may not have detected an effect is due 
to insufficient power. Indeed, Post-hoc power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) 
indicted that we only had 22% power to detect the effect. Nonetheless, while no significant 
trend was detected (p = .219), the pattern of means was still in the direction predicted (Low < 
Moderate < High, Table 5).  
Perceived Intentions to make the Changes. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA 
showed that how costly the decision was had no effect on perceptions of the Chief of 
Operations’ intentions to make the changes, F(2,272) = 0.395, p = .674, η2 = .003) (Table 5).  
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Pathway from Profit to Perceived Intentions to Harm via Perceived 
Justifiability. Mediation using the MEDMOD package in JAMOVI and 5000 bootstrap 
samples revealed that increases in the costs of the Chief of Operations’ decisions was 
associated with increased perceived intentions to annoy the fans and that a decrease in the 
perceived justifiability of the decision mediated this link (indirect effect: 0.10, 95%CI:[0.02, 
0.18], SE = 0.04, p = .018). Increase in cost was associated with decreased perceptions that 
the decision was justified (B = -0.34, 95%CI:[-0.53, -0.14], SE = 0.10, p < .001). An increase 
in the perceived justifiability of the decision was associated with a decrease in perceptions 
that the Chief of Operations intentionally annoyed the fans (B = -0.30, 95%CI:[-0.45, -0.14], 
SE = 0.08, p < .001). The remaining direct effect was non-significant (B = 0.07, 95%CI:[-
0.20, 0.34], SE = 0.14, p = .569), indicating that the effect was fully mediated.  
Exploratory Analyses  
People who judged harm as justified judged it as not intentional. Exploratory 
analyses indicate that TJM’s key prediction that people who judge a decision to cause harm 
as unjustified will judge the harm as intentional, whereas people who judge the decision as 
justified will judge the harm as not intentional was supported: people who judged the 
decision as definitely unjustified (i.e., reported justifiability of 1, N = 9) judged the harm as 
intentional (M = 4.89, SD = 2.15), whereas people who thought the decision was definitely 
justified (i.e., reported justifiability of 7, N = 14) judged the harm as not intentional (M = 
2.57, SD = 1.83). 
Comparison of Experiment 3a and 3b. Overall, the same key pattern was present in 
Experiment 3b as 3a. However, there did appear to be some prima-facie differences (e.g., 
people in 3b seemed to judge the harm as more justified). We wanted to investigate potential 
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causes of this further, so we combined the data from both experiments and ran some 
exploratory analyses. 
A 2x3 ANOVA (experiment x condition) revealed a significant effect of condition, 
F(2,555) = 19.10, p < .001, η2 = .063, and Experiment, F(2,555) = 15.10, p < .001, η2 = .025, 
on perceived justifiability (the interaction was not significant p = .466). The same pattern that 
was present in each experiment emerged: as the costs increased, people became less likely to 
judge the decision as justified, B = 0.59, p < .001. Curiously, people in Experiment 3b were 
more likely to judge the decision as justified (M = 4.43, SD = 1.39) than in 3a (M = 3.97, SD 
= 1.39), t(555) = 3.90 , pbonferroni < .001 , d = 0.165. As age is a predictor of perceived 
justifiability in loose countries (Jiang et al., 2015), this difference could be attributed to the 
fact that the sample in 3b was significantly younger than 2a (MDIFF = 7 years), t(559) = 9.74 , 
p < .001 , d = 0.82. Indeed, follow-up regression analysis showed that age was a significant 
predictor of perceived justifiability (B = -.01, 95%CI:[-.027, -.002], t(560) = -2.32, p = .021). 
We ran a second 2x3 ANOVA (experiment x condition) testing for any differences in 
intentionality judgements across experiments and, crucially, if there was an effect of cost on 
intention judgements when the data from the two Experiments were combined. As expected, 
there was a main effect of cost on perceived harmful intentions, F(2,555) = 4.78, p = .009, η2 
= .017, such that as the costs increased so too did perceived harmful intentions, B = -0.41, p = 
002. No effect of experiment on judgements of intentions to harm was detected, F(2,555) = 
2.86, p = .091, η2 = .005. Collating across both experiments, TJM’s predictions were 
supported: as the costs increased, perceived justifiability would decrease, and, consequently, 
perceived harmful intentions increased.  
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Discussion 
Experiment 3b tested the generalizability and replicability of 3a by keeping the 
stimuli constant and using a culturally distinct sample (Polish compared to American). 
Overall, Experiment 3b replicated the key results from 3a: judgements of harmful intentions 
were mediated by the perceived justifiability of the harm. When people judged the decision 
as unjustified they judged the harm as intentional, but when they judged the decision as 
justified the harm was judged as not intentional. 
Experiment 3b had limitations not present in 3a. For example, some people thought 
that the Vice-Production manager was the boss of the Chief of Operations (CoO) and was 
pressuring the CoO into making the changes, thus, justifying the CoO’s decision regardless of 
condition (e.g., “He was made to do it by his boss…”). This, combined with the fact that the 
sample was significantly younger and therefore more likely to judge the decision as justified, 
were presumably the causes for the weaker manipulation and for not being able to detect an 
effect of cost on intentionality judgements.  
Combined, however, the results of Experiment 3a and 3b, support TJM’s 
predictions—people’s judgements of whether the harm was intentional tracked the perceived 
justifiability of the harm. Manipulating the justifiability of causing harm has now been shown 
to affect attributions of intentions in people from 4 different countries (UK, SA, USA, and 
Poland) with 3 separate vignettes—one manipulating costs, the others benefits. Experiment 4 
sought to test the effect of justifiability on intention judgements using a different paradigm. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 aimed to test whether new information about the justifiability of causing 
a harm is incorporated into people’s judgements or if people are anchoring on their initial 
judgement and not changing their attributions. Similar to Monroe and Malle’s (2017, 2019) 
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updating blame paradigm, people will read a scenario about a person who causes harm and 
make an initial judgement about the person’s intentions and the justifiability of the harm. 
After making this initial judgement people will be provided with new information that 
increases, decreases, or does not affect the justifiability of the harm and given an opportunity 
to update their judgements. TJM predicts that people will update their judgements of a 
person’s intentions based on new (un)justifying social information. Specifically, that 
judgements that the harm was intentional will decrease when people are given new justifying 
social information. Conversely, that judgements that the harm was intentional will increase 
when people are given new unjustifying social information. Furthermore, that new 
information that does not affect the justifiability of the harm (irrelevant social information) 
will not affect people’s judgements. 
Method 
Preregistration https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=yr8qi8  
Procedure 
Participants read 15 different vignettes, presented in random order, about agents who 
caused harm. After reading each vignette, participants made an initial judgement about 
whether they thought the harm was intentional and whether they thought the harm was 
justified. After making their initial judgement, participants were given more information 
about the scenario. There were three different types of new information provided: Justifying 
social information, which makes the harm appear more justified; Unjustifying social 
information, which makes the harm appear less justified; and irrelevant information, which 
does not affect the justifiability of the harm. Each new type of information was presented five 
times (i.e., participants got new unjustifying information five times, new justifying social 
information five times, and new irrelevant information five times). After reading the new 
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information participants were shown their initial judgements on a new screen and given the 
opportunity to update their judgements with the prompt, “If your judgements about … have 
changed, please indicate by moving the sliders from their original position on the next 
screen.” 
Participants 
In within-subjects design studies with three conditions and five stimulus replication 
per design cell, G-power (Faul et al., 2009) recommends using a minimum sample size of 33 
participants to detect a moderate effect size (η2 = .06) with .8 power. We will request a 
sample of 50 students to ensure that we have sufficient power (> .8) even after excluding 
inattentive participants. 
50 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand were requested to participate in this study for course credit. Seven were excluded for 
failing an attention check, leaving a final sample of 43 participants (Mage = 24.0, SD = 7.70). 
The majority were female (30 Female, 13 Male) and of New Zealand European ethnicity 
(72% New Zealand European, Other 16%, 5% Māori, 5% Chinese).  
Measures  
The measures were the same as in previous studies but with slight changes in wording 
to fit the vignettes (e.g., “Did Andrew intentionally cause the old lady to get hurt? Was 
Andrew justified in not giving up his seat?”).  
Example Vignette 
A little old lady came onto the bus and needed a place to sit. Andrew knew she’d 
stumble and hurt herself as the bus took off if she didn’t get a seat. Yet, Andrew did 
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not offer his seat to her. She didn’t get a seat and, sure enough, as the bus took off the 
lady stumbled and hurt herself. 
Example New Information  
Andrew had recently broken his knee and standing on the bus would have caused him 
great pain. 
Results 
Results are robust to exclusions—the same pattern of results is shown with and 
without exclusions. As we had preregistered excluding participants, the results we report here 
are with participants excluded. 
Manipulation Check 
As preregistered, we went through each of the vignettes and checked that the changes 
in mean justifiability ratings were in the predicted direction for each of the new type of social 
information. All changes in means were in the predicted direction, thus, analyses reported 
here collapse across vignettes with the same type of new social information.  
Key Results 
The Trade-off Justification Model predicts that intentionality judgements will 
decrease or increase as a function of the agent’s perceived justifiability in causing harm: 
decreased justifiability increases intentionality, whereas increased justifiability decreases 
intentionality. A within-subjects ANOVA showed that new type of information presented 
accounted for 43% of the variance updated intentionality judgements, F(2, 642) = 245.9, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .434 (Figure 9). Crucially, the preregistered post-hoc tests were all 
supported (discussed in detail in the following three sub-sections).  
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Figure 9  
Mean Change in Intentionality and Justifiability Judgements as a Function of New 
Information Type 
 
Note. Change scores = Updated Judgement – Initial Judgement. Error Bars = 95% CI. 
New Justifying Social Information Increased Perceived Justifiability of Harming 
and Decreased Perceived Intention to Harm. As predicted, when participants were 
provided with new justifying social information they updated their judgements of the 
justifiability of harming, viewing it as more justified (MCHANGE = 2.14, SDCHANGE  = 1.83, 
Table 6, Figure 9). Crucial to TJM’s prediction, people also updated their judgements of the 
person’s intentions, perceiving the harm as less intentional (MCHANGE = -0.95, SDCHANGE  = 
0.96).   
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Table 6 
Means (and standard deviations) in Experiment 4 by Type of New Information 
 
 
 New Unjustifying Social Information Decreased Perceived Justifiability of 
Harming and Increased Perceived Intention to Harm. As predicted, when participants 
were provided with new unjustifying social information they updated their judgements of the 
justifiability of harming, viewing it as less justified (MCHANGE = -1.95, SDCHANGE  = 1.56,  
Table 6). Consequently, people also updated their judgements of the person’s intentions, 
perceiving the harm as more intentional (MCHANGE = 2.15, SDCHANGE  = 1.82). 
New Irrelevant Social Information Had no Effect on Perceived Intention to 
Harm. As predicted, when participants were provided with new irrelevant social information 
they did not change their judgements of the justifiability of harming (MCHANGE = 0.24, 
SDCHANGE  = 0.72,   Table 6). Crucially, people also did not change their judgements of the 
person’s intentions—the harm was perceived as no more or less intentional (MCHANGE = 0.12, 
SDCHANGE  = 0.63). 
Exploratory Analyses 
In Experiment 1, when looking across vignettes, the ones that were perceived as less 
justified were judged as more intentional. We were interested if this trend replicated. Thus, as 
in Experiment 1, we used linear mixed models in Jamovi (clustering by vignette and 
including random slopes and intercepts for each vignette) to estimate the effect of justifying 
 Intentionality    Justifiability    
Condition Initial Updated t(642) pTukey d Initial Updated t(642) pTukey d 
New Justifying 
Information 4.48(1.76) 3.53(1.97) 9.51 <.001 -0.57 2.92(1.46) 5.07(1.77) -21.69 <.001 1.17 
           
New Unjustifying 
Information 2.73(1.54) 4.88(1.87) -21.37 <.001 1.18 4.38(1.48) 2.42(1.49) 19.76 <.001 -1.25 
           
New Irrelevant 
Information 4.70(1.62) 4.82(1.63) -1.2 0.837 0.19 2.62(1.42) 2.38(1.42) 2.40 0.158 -0.33 
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social information on intentions at the vignette level. Results show the same overall pattern as 
in Experiment 3 for the original judgements (B = -0.32, 95%CI:[-.41, -.24], t(11.6) = - 7.18, p 
< .001, R2conditional = .35, Figure 10 bottom left), updated judgements (B = -0.42, 95%CI:[-.50, 
-.35], t(13.9) = - 6.98, p < .001, R2conditional = .36, Figure 10 bottom right), and change 
judgements (B = -0.37, 95%CI:[-.47, -.28], t(10.5) = -7.81, p < .001, R2conditional = .45, Figure 
10 bottom right). 
Figure 10  
Line Graph showing the Negative Association between Mean Intentionality and Mean 
Justifiability Responses across the Series of Vignettes in Experiment 4 
 
Note. Bottom left shows the relationship between justifiability and intentionality for 
participant’s initial judgements, bottom right shows the relationship between justifiability and 
intentionality for participant’s updated judgements, and the top figure shows the relationship 
between justifiability and intentionality for participant’s change scores. Change scores = 
Updated Judgement – Initial Judgement. The full vignettes are available in the appendix. 
Vignette number 7 (Jordan) was a notable exception to the trend. Presumably, this is 
because the vignette included an extra-piece of social information—hurtful words towards 
the victim—that increased certainty that the harm was intentional. Indeed, common open-
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ended responses such as, “Jordan's coworker responded in a very unkind way when she asked 
why she wasn't invite to lunch. This suggests that Jordan's coworkers intentionally did not 
invite [her] to lunch despite knowing that it would upset her” and “...the co worker didn't 
need to answer her in a harsh way, that shows that they had done it [(hurt her)] intentionally.” 
support this interpretation.  
Discussion  
Experiment 4 extended support for TJM by showing that people’s judgements of 
whether someone intentionally caused harm tracks information about the justifiability of 
causing the harm: when people were given new information that decreased the justifiability 
of causing the harm, they changed their judgements, perceiving the harm as more intentional. 
Moreover, when people were provided with new information that increased the justifiability 
of causing the harm they also changed their judgements, perceiving the harm as less 
intentional. Crucially, however, when people were provided with new information that did 
not affect the justifiability of the harm, people did not change their judgements. 
Experiment 4 also showed the same overall pattern as in Experiment 1: across a wide 
range of scenarios a general trend emerged showing that harms judged as more justified are 
perceived as less intentional. There was the exception of vignette number 7 (Jordan) which 
was judged as far more intentional than other scenarios with similar justifiability. This is 
likely due to this vignette including an extra piece of social information—hurtful words 
towards the victim. This result does not conflict with TJM as TJM argues that people utilize 
various pieces of social information (but particularly information about the justifiability of 
the harm) when inferring others’ intentions. Thus, it makes sense that when more information 
is provided, people attribute more intentionality to the person.  
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We argue this and the previous experiments have validated the hypothesized 
mechanism behind how people attribute intentions. We now aim to build off the finding that 
justifiability is linked to intentionality judgements by investigating how observer’s 
dispositional beliefs can affect the perceived justifiability of a harm, causing some people to 
perceive a harm as more or less intentional than others. 
Experiment 5 
The Trade-off Justification Model hypothesizes that differences in whether causing 
harm is perceived as intentional is due to differences in the perceived justification of causing 
the harm—unjustified harms are judged intentional—but how are observer’s judging the 
justifiability of the harm? Put differently, what causes observers to arrive at different 
judgements of the justifiability of a harm, and, consequently, whether a harm is judged 
intentional? Previous research has shown that what actions are perceived as unjustified differs 
from culture to culture (Bahník et al., 2019; Haerpfer et al., 2020; Jiang et al., 2015). 
Experiment 5 thus builds on the previous findings by adding a cross-cultural component. We 
reason that people’s cultural backgrounds affect perceptions of the justifiability of certain 
actions and therefore how intentional the actions’ harmful side-effects are perceived to be.  
In the Chinese cultural context education is highly prized—it is perceived as key to 
being successful and children spend many hours in afterschool education programs, known as 
cram schools (Larmer, 2014, December 31). In the USA context, education is comparatively 
less prioritized and attending cram schools is far from the norm. We utilize this difference 
and created a scenario (see below) where a father sends their son to an afterschool exam 
preparation program/programme (cram school) with the harmful consequence of greatly 
upsetting them. As education is highly prized and sending children to cram schools is normal 
in China, we predict that Chinese participants would judge the father’s decision as more 
justified and the harm as less intentional than American participants.  
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The harm in this experiment is minor compared to typical harms in the literature 
(upsetting a child vs destroying the environment). We kept the harm minor to keep as much 
consistent across the vignettes as possible while still having the harm question make sense to 
people from both nationalities. If we had based our scenario off a taboo that existed in one 
country but not another (eating meat during certain periods of the year, for example) then the 
question about whether someone intentionally caused harm by deciding to violate the taboo 
would be nonsensical in one cultural context because no harm (taboo violation) would be 
perceived.  
Method 
Preregistration https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=iu8tj6  
Procedure 
Participants were assigned to one of two conditions based on their nationality. The 
changes between conditions were made to reflect the different cultural contexts (e.g., 
different spellings and names) and are non-substantial. Participants read a vignette (see 
below) and then answered questions about the justifiability of the Father’s decision and the 
Father’s intentions. The order of the justifiability and intention questions were randomized to 
avoid possible order effects. Participants then completed demographics (gender, age, 
ethnicity) and were debriefed. 
Participants 
As preregistered, we requested 100 non-Asian American Nationals and 100 Chinese 
nationals who are fluent in English from Prolific. Prolific sent 202 participants. Six requested 
their data be deleted, 13 were excluded for failing the attention check, and 7 more were 
excluded for having a nationality that conflicted with the sampling criteria (e.g., we excluded 
participants who indicated they had American or Canadian nationality when we requested for 
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Chinese nationals). Leaving a final sample of 182 participants (88 Chinese nationals, 94 US 
nationals). Chinese nationals were slightly younger (Mage = 27.90, SD = 7.58, vs Mage = 
30.90, SD = 11.00) and had more female participants (54 Female, 34 Male vs 37 Female, 54 
Male, and 3 Gender diverse). 
Measures 
The measures were the same as in previous studies but with slight changes in wording 
to fit the vignettes (e.g., “Did Jordan's/Jun's Father intentionally upset him?”). 
Vignette 
Jordan's/Jun's mother said to his father, "should we enroll/enrol Jordan/Jun in the 
afterschool exam preparation program/programme (cram school)? It will improve his 
grades from B+ to straight A's but will also mean he won't have time to play soccer 
anymore. He'll be really upset at having to quit the team. What do you think?" 
Jordan's/Jun's father replied, "He must focus more on his education than playing 
games. I'm enrolling him." Jordan/Jun was sent to the afterschool exam preparation 
program/programme (cram school). Sure enough, Jordan/Jun was very upset at having 
to quit playing soccer.3 
Results 
As predicted, Chinese nationals rated the father’s decision to send their child to cram 
school as more justified and the decision’s harmful consequence as less intentional than 
American nationals (Table 7). 
 
 
                                                            
3 When designing this scenario we consulted with one of the authors Chinese friends to ensure it was framed 
appropriatly.  
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Table 7  
Means (and standard deviations) in Experiment 5 by Nationality 
Measure Nationality    M(SD) t(180) p D d 95%CI 
Justified American 3.61(1.55) 3.69 < .001 0.55 [0.24, 0.85]  
 Chinese 4.43(1.42)    
Intentionality American 3.84(1.80) -4.32 < .001 -0.63 [-0.95, -0.33] 




Pathway from Nationality to Perceived Intentions to Harm via Perceived 
Justifiability. Mediation using the MEDMOD package in JAMOVI and 5000 bootstrap 
samples revealed that Chinese nationals were associated with a decrease in ratings that the 
Father intentionally upset their child, however, the indirect effect of an increase in the 
perceived justifiability of the father’s decision to send their child to cram school did not 
mediated this link (indirect effect: -.17, 95%CI:[-0.37, 0.00], SE = 0.09, p = .068; Figure 11). 
Though the model did not reach significance when bootstrapped, the non-bootstrapped model 
did (p = .049) and the coefficients were comparable to the previous models. We thus reason 
that the effect was mediated but lacked power to reach significance. Indeed, we based power 
off the t-test, not mediation. Had we gone for mediation, the recommended sample to reach 
sufficient power for this model is around 400 (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007), over double what 
we recruited. 
Though the overall bootstrapped model was not significant, the Chinese national 
sample was still associated with increased perceptions that the father’s decision was justified 
(B = 0.82, 95%CI:[0.39, 1.26], SE = 0.22, p < .001), and an increase in the perceived 
justifiability of the father’s decision was still associated with a decrease in perceptions that 
the father intentionally upset their son (B = -0.20, 95%CI:[-0.40, -0.00], SE = 0.10, p = .042). 
There was a large, significant remaining direct effect (B = -0.96, 95%CI:[-1.65, -0.61], SE = 
0.27, p < .001) indicating that the effect was not fully mediated (Figure 11). Overall, the 
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A: B = 0.82*** 
SE = .22 
B: B = -.20** 
SE = .10 
 
 
C: B = -.1.13*** 
SE = .27 
 C': B = -0.96*** 
SE = .27 
 
model supports the idea that cultural differences in the perceived justifiability of causing 










Previous studies on TJM have not specifically tested where justifiability comes from. 
While previous research has shown that roles (Rowe et al., 2020) and taboos (Vonasch & 
Baumeister, 2017) affect perceived justifiability, the interaction between the observer and the 
scenario has not been tested. This study shows that culture sets the norms/values people use 
to evaluate the justifiability of causing harm and, thereby, the intentionality of different acts. 
Experiment 5 thus supports an important extension of the hypothesized link between 
justifiability and intentionality: people from different nationalities judged the intentionality of 
a harm differently based on how their cultural background affected the perceived justifiability 
of the harm. Chinese participants viewed the decision to send a child to cram school as more 
justified and the resulting harm (the child becoming upset) as less intentional than American 
participants.  
Because the harm had to be minor so that the question made sense to people from 
both nationalities it was viewed as at least somewhat justified in both countries. Thus, the 
results were limited to showing that one culture rated the harm as less intentional than 
Figure 11  
Mediation Model Depicting the Pathway from Nationality to Reduced Perceived Intentions to 
Harm via Increased Perceived Justifiability in Experiment 5 
Justifiability 
Intentions Nationality 
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another. However, we believe that stronger effects—such as a harm being judged intentional 
in one culture but not intentional in another—can in principle be shown.  
Experiment 6 
The previous experiment tested how culture can set the values and norms people use 
to evaluate justifiability and, consequently, intentionality. In this study we examine whether a 
specific group affiliation/identity can have the same effect. 
People identify with all types of groups—some people identify more with 
authoritarian groups, others with libertarian groups; some with affirmative action, others with 
equal opportunity; some with Black Lives Matter, some with Blue Lives Matter. Presumably, 
these differences lead to variation in whether certain actions—such as the use of force by 
officers—are justified, and, consequently, judgements of whether resulting harms were 
intentional. Experiment 6 thus investigates the effects of people’s group identities—
specifically, their overall ideological stance towards Black/Blue Lives Matter—on 
judgements of whether an officer was justified in their use of force and whether the officer is 
perceived to have intentionally caused a protestor (Martin Gugino) harm. 
We have three key hypotheses: 
H1: People’s level of identification with Black/Blue Lives Matter will predict their 
judgements of the justifiability of the officer’s actions: People who identify more with 
Black Lives Matter will judge the officer’s actions as more unjustified than people 
who identify more with Blue Lives Matter.  
H2: People’s perceived justifiability of the officer’s actions will predict their 
intentionality judgements: People who judge the push as unjustified will judge the 
harm more intentional. 
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H3: The link between people’s overall level of identification with Black/Blue Lives 




Preregistration https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=fn3sh7  
Participants  
We recruited participants from Amazons Mechanical Turk on the 7th of July, 2020 
less than 1 month after the incident when it was still a lively topic on social media. We 
requested 250 participants based on prior research indicating this is when correlations 
stabilize (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). Mturk sent 261 participants; 40 were excluded from 
the analyses because they failed an attention check and 12 because they did not complete the 
study, leaving a total sample of 209 participants (Mage = 35.7, SD = 11.0) (137 Males, 71 
Females, and 1 non-binary). The majority of participants were White (61%), Black or African 
American (21%), or Asian (14%), tended to identify more strongly with Black than Blue 
Lives Matter (M = 4.48, SD =1.58) (on a scale of 1-6 where 1 = more strongly identify with 
Blue Lives Matter and 6 = more strongly identify with Black Lives Matter), and tended to be 
more Liberal (N=107) compared to Conservative (N=63).  
Procedure 
All participants watched the same video of the officer pushing Martin Gugino, who 
then fell on the ground and head started bleeding (video available via OSF 
https://osf.io/u9sp6/?view_only=9cb9b9749dae4a34a72e27ae083c5d50). Participants 
answered all of the same questions, however, the order in which this was done was 
counterbalanced. Participants either answered the key ‘Identify Black vs Blue Lives Matter’ 
question and related demographic questions first, and then watched the video of the officer 
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pushing Martin Gugino and answered questions about the officer’s intentions etc. Or, 
participants watched the video and answered the related questions about the officer’s 
intentions etc., before answering the key ‘Identify Black vs Blue Lives Matter’ question and 
related demographic questions. The order of the dependent variables (perceived intentions, 
justifiability, blameworthiness) were counterbalanced, appeared one at a time, and 
participants could not go back and change their answers. The last two questions were always 
how much participants support Black (Blue) lives matter, presented in random order. 
Measures  
Responses to the measure of identification with Black vs Blue lives Matter was 
recorded on a 6-point Likert scale where 1 = identify most with Blue Lives Matter and 6 = 
identify most with Black Lives Matter.  Intentionality and justifiability were measured on 7-
point Likert scales where 1 = definitely not, and 7 = definitely yes, and blame was measured 
on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 = no blame at all, and 7 = the most blame you would ever 
give. 
Level of identifying with Black vs Blue Lives Matter. “Currently in the U.S. there 
is a lot of debate over policing and race. These issues are complex and people sometimes find 
themselves identifying with different movements. We want you to think about your 
identification with two different movements: the Black lives Matter movement and the Blue 
lives Matter movement. Of these two movements, which do you more strongly identify 
with?”.  
Intentions to Harm. “Did the Officer intentionally harm the man?” 
Intentions to Push. “Did the Officer intentionally push the man?” 
Justifiability. “Do you think the police officer was justified in pushing the man?”  
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Blame. “How much blame does the officer deserve?” 
Attention check. “Explain why you think the officer was/was not justified in pushing 
the man.” Participants who gave off-subject reasoning were excluded (e.g., “Nice”).  
Measurement Validity Check.  
The validity of the ‘identify’ question was checked by asking on separate 6-point 
Likert scales where 1 = not at all and 6 = a great deal the following questions: 
Support for Blue Lives Matter. “How much do you support Blue Lives Matter”  
Support for Black Lives Matter. “How much do you support Black Lives Matter” 
Results 
Before analyzing the key results, we first investigated the validity of our key 
‘identify’ measure and whether there were any order effects.   
Measurement Validation 
Consistency Check. As preregistered, the ‘identify’ question’s validity was 
investigated by checking that the movement participants most strongly identified with was 
also the movement they most strongly supported. For example, if a person responded ‘5’ to 
the ‘identify’ question (indicating they more strongly identified with the Black Lives Matter 
movement) they were judged to be consistent if they more strongly (or equally strongly) 
supported Black compared to Blue Lives Matter. Only 10 responses (5%) were inconsistent, 
indicating that the measure was valid. All key results were robust to excluding or including 
inconsistent responses. In an effort to be conservative with exclusions, we decided to report 
all analyses with these participants included.  
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Exploratory Measurement Check. Further support for the validity of the identify 
measure was obtained via assessing convergent validity. If the measure is valid, support for 
Blue Lives Matter should be negatively correlated with Identifying more with Black 
compared to Blue lives matter and support for Black Lives Matter should be positively 
correlated with Identifying more with Black compared to Blue Lives Matter. Indeed, this is 
what we found: Support for Blue Lives Matter was negatively correlated with identifying 
with Black compared to Blue Lives Matter (r = -.38, p < .001) indicating that the more 
strongly a person supported Blue Lives Matter the more strongly they identified with Blue 
compared to Black Lives Matter. In comparison, support for Black Lives Matter was very 
strongly positively correlated with the ‘identify’ question (r = .85, p < .001), indicating that 
the more strongly a person supported Black Lives Matter the more strongly they identified 
with Black compared to Blue Lives Matter.  
Order effects 
A One-Way ANOVA revealed that video presentation order (whether participants saw 
the demographic questions or video first) had no effect on any of the DVs or the key 
‘identify’ question (all p’s > .07). There was an effect of video presentation order on support 
for Blue Lives Matter (MVideoFirst = 2.85, SD = 1.66, MDemographicsFirst = 3.33, SD = 1.76, p = 
.045). People who saw the video first tended to support Blue Lives Matter less compared to 
those who answered the demographic questions first. However, as this question always came 
after the video, the effect is likely not attributable to its order of presentation. As no other 
effects were significant, video presentation order was collapsed into one group. 
A separate One-Way ANOVA revealed no effect of question order on attributions of 
intentions, perceived justifiability, or blameworthiness (all p’s > .06). Thus, responses were 
collapsed into one group. 
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An independent samples t-test revealed that the order the ‘support’ question had no 
effect on how much participants supported Black, t(207) = 1.66, p = .098, or Blue Lives 
Matter, t(207) = .04, p = .968.  
Key results 
Predicting Perceived Justifiability of the Push. We regressed participants’ 
perceived justifiability onto level of identifying with Blue/Black Lives Matter (i.e., using 
degree of identifying with Blue/Black Lives Matter to predict perceived justifiability). As 
predicted, the more people identified with Black compared to Blue Lives Matter, the less they 
perceived the push to be justified, B = -.59, 95%CI:[-.59, -.34], t(207) = 7.57, p < .001, R2 = 
.217. Thus, people’s overall ideological stance towards Black/Blue Lives Matter was 
consistent with their judgements of a relevant police action. Supporters of Black Lives Matter 
were more likely to judge a violent act by police as unjustified (presumably, because they 
perceived the act to be violent, unnecessary, or undeserved), whereas supporters of Blue 
Lives Matter were more likely to judge the same act as justified (presumably, to preserve 
order and control over the situation).   
Participants’ open-ended responses provided some support that these were the reasons 
some people thought the push was or was not justified. For example, 11 people who 
identified more strongly with Black Lives Matter included in their explanations key words 
such as “excessive”, “unnecessary”, or “didn’t deserve” indicating that they thought the 
officer’s violent action was unjustified because it was unnecessary, excessive, or that the man 
did not deserve to be treated like that. Comparatively, only 1 person who identified more with 
Blue Lives Matter more included these key words.  
 
UNJUSTIFIED HARMING SIGNALS HARM WAS INTENTIONAL                          61 
 
Predicting Perceived Intentions to Harm. In a separate regression, participants’ 
ratings of the officer’s intentions to harm the man were regressed onto perceived justification 
(i.e., using perceived justification to predict perceived intentions). As hypothesized, the more 
people judged the officer’s actions as justified, the less they perceived the harm to be 
intentional (B = -.372, 95%CI:[-.53, -.28], t(207) = 6.36 , p < .001, R2 = .164). Thus, as 
predicted by TJM, people’s judgements about the justifiability of the officer’s actions were 
linked to their intention judgments: people who judged the action as unjustified thought it 
was more likely to be intentional, whereas people who judged the action as justified thought 
it was more likely to be unintentional.  
Predicted Pathway to Perceived Intentions: Ideological Stance to Perceived 
Intentions via Perceived Justifiability. As predicted, mediation using the MEDMOD 
package in JAMOVI and 5000 bootstrap samples revealed that strength of identifying with 
Black compared to Blue Lives Matter increased perceived harmful intentions via a decrease 
in perceived justifiability(indirect effect: 0.131, SE = 0.05, 95%CI:[.04, .23], p = .007; Figure 
12). Increased strength in identifying with Black compared to Blue Lives Matter decreased 
perceptions that the officer’s actions were justified (B = -.59, 95%CI:[-.75, -.44], SE = .08, p 
< .001). A decrease in perceived justifiability was associated with an increase in perceived 
harmful intentions (B = -.22, 95%CI:[-.36, .08], SE = .07, p = .002). After accounting for the 
indirect effect, the direct effect was still significant (B = .41, 95%CI:[.24, .58], SE = .09, p 
<.001), meaning perceived justifiability partially mediated the relationship between ideology 
and perceived intentions. Thus, as hypothesized, peoples ideological stance towards 
Black/Blue Lives Matter affected their interpretation of an officer’s intentions because of 
how their ideological stance affected their judgments of the justifiability of the officer’s 
actions: identifying more with Black compared to Blue Lives Matter meant people were more 
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B: B = -.36** 
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C: B = .54*** 
SE = .07 
 C': B = .41*** 
SE = .09 
 
likely to see the officer’s actions as unjustified and, consequently, to interpret the harm as 
intentional (Figure 12).   
Figure 12  
Mediation Model Depicting the Pathway from Strength of Identifying with Black Compared 











Polarized Extremes. Notably, a spike in judgements of justifiability and 
intentionality occurs at the extreme ranges of the identification scale (Figure 13). People at 
the extreme end of identifying most Blue Lives Matter judged the harm as far more justified 
(MDIFF = 2.12, d = 1.13) and less intentional (MDIFF = -1.12, d = 0.65) than varying one point 
off towards the middle (i.e., the mean difference in judgements is major when comparing 
between 5 and 6 on the scale). When moving off the extreme, however, the difference 
becomes more subtle (the mean difference in judgements is minor when comparing people on 
a 4 vs 5 on the scale than 5 vs 6) until you get to the opposite extreme of people who 
identified most with Black Lives Matter who judged the harm as far less justified (MDIFF = -
1.38, d = 0.82) and more intentional (MDIFF = 0.48, d = .30) than varying one point off back 
towards the middle. Most of the conflicting opinions of whether the officer intentionally 
caused harm thus appears to be between the minority of people at either extreme (43%) than 
people at neither extreme (57%). 
Justifiability 
Intentions Identify  
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Figure 13  
Mean Justifiability and intentionality responses in Experiment 6 by Level of Identification 
with Black vs Blue Lives Matter 
 
Note. Responses to the measure of identification with Black vs Blue lives Matter was 
recorded on a 6-point Likert scale where 1 = identify most with Blue Lives Matter and 6 = 
identify most with Black Lives Matter.  Intentionality and justifiability were measured on 7-




Prior Knowledge. Overall, 64% of participants had seen the video prior to taking the 
study. Prior knowledge had no effect on any of the key variables (all p’s > .08). While prior 
knowledge had no effect, a greater percentage of Liberals (67%) compared to Conservatives 
(52%) and had seen the video before. Thus, results indicate a relationship between ideology 
and media consumption.  
Exploring Base-rates. Consistent with TJM, paired with an overall tendency to 
perceive the harm as intentional (M = 4.97, SD = 1.85) was a tendency to judge the officer’s 
actions as unjustified (M = 2.67, SD = 2.01) (Table 8). Consistent with prior findings, 
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participants also judged concrete actions (pushing someone) as more intentional (M = 6.10, 
SD = 1.30) compared to abstract outcomes (harming someone) (M = 4.97, SD = 1.85).  
Table 8  
Participant Responses in Experiment 6 
 
Intentionally Push Intentionally Harm Justified Blame 
Mean 6.10 4.97 2.67 5.68 
Standard deviation 1.30 1.85 2.01 1.65 
Note. Items were measured on separate 7-point Likert scales with higher numbers indicating 
higher perceived intentionality and justifiability, and more attributed blame.  
 
Support for Blue Lives Matter was fairly high overall, but not as high as Black Lives 
Matter (see Table 9). Liberals tended to identify with Black more than Blue Lives Matter and 
to support Black Lives Matter more than Blue Lives Matter. Conservatives also tended to 
identify more with Black Lives Matter (but less so than Liberals).  
Table 9  
Level of Identifying with, and Support for, Black and Blue Lives Matter in Experiment 6 
  Overall Liberals Conservatives  
Identify Black vs Blue 4.48 (1.58) 5.09 (1.23)  3.70 (1.73) 
Support Black 4.41 (1.72) 5.04 (1.39) 4.16 (1.35) 
Support Blue 3.08 (1.72)  2.46 (1.65) 3.70 (1.96) 
Note. level of identifying with Black compared to Blue Lives Matter was measured on a scale 
of 1-6 where 1 = more strongly identify with Blue Lives Matter and 6 = more strongly 
identify with Black Lives Matter. Participants were treated as Liberal/Conservative if they 
responded either “Very Liberal/Conservative”, “Liberal/Conservative”, “Somewhat 





Experiment 6 showed that people’s political identities, like culture, can inform their 
judgments of justification and intentionality. Despite observing the same situation, peoples’ 
political beliefs affected whether they judged the harm to a protester as justified, and, 
consequently, whether the harm to the protestor was caused intentionally. People who 
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supported Black Lives Matter more than Blue Lives Matter perceived the harm to a protester 
as less justified, and, consequently, more intentional; whereas people who identified as 
supporting the Blue Lives Matter movement were more likely to view the officer’s behavior 
as justified and the harm as unintentional.  
Crucially, the effects in this experiment were much stronger than in Experiment 5: 
rather than one group/nationality judging the harm as less intentional, people at either 
ideological extreme made opposite judgements—one group judged it as intentional and 
unjustified whereas the other judged it as not intentional and justified (Figure 13). The flow 
on effects of this are radical. Perceived intentionality underlies legal decisions—was it 
murder or manslaughter?—political decisions—to cancel or to propagate someone?—and 
social decisions—is this person or group friend or foe? A jury of people where one ideology 
is dominant may see a harm as intentional and convict the assailant whereas a jury with a 
different dominant ideology may see it as unintentional and allow the assailant to go free, for 
example. While these implications may seem pessimistic to some, the mechanism can also 
provide hope—group conflict may be able to be reduced if people can come to see the 
justifying reasons behind harmful actions and thus that the harm may not have actually been 
intentional. However, these implications are purely speculative, future research needs to test 
the flow on effects.  
Indeed, we are cautious of over claiming based on the results of one experiment. 
However, the results of the previously noted observer effects are consistent with our 
explanation, further supporting our claims. Moreover, previous research on TJM as well as 
Experiments 1-4 all indicate the validity of the proposed mechanism. Experiments 5 & 6 
simply verify an important extension of this mechanism—people’s perceptions of others are 
informed by their personal identities (which group membership is a part of). 
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General Discussion 
Eight preregistered experiments found that people utilize information about the 
justifiability of causing a harm when determining whether it was caused intentionally. In 
particular, these experiments found that people judge less justified harms as more intentional 
across a variety of situations (Experiments 1-4), and that people update their judgements of 
intentionality when given new (un)justifying information (Experiment 4). These findings are 
all predicted by the Trade-off Justification Model (TJM), according to which causing harm 
without justification signals that the person harmed intentionally. Crucially, the last two 
experiments support an important extension of the hypothesized link between justifiability 
and intentionality—observer’s cultural (Experiment 5) and group (Experiment 6) identities 
set the norms/values they use to evaluate the justifiability of causing harm and, thereby, the 
intentionality of different acts. People’s perceptions of others are thus informed by their 
personal identities. 
Research supporting theories of attributions based on social information have been 
used to support the idea that intention judgements can be explained without appealing to the 
observer’s moral convictions (a part of people’s identities)—information from the context is 
sufficient to explain people’s judgements (Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010, p.99). An observer may 
use whether someone’s actions violate a moral norm to inform their intention judgements, but 
their moral beliefs are not strictly part of this process. Rather, moral norms function as a 
particular piece of social information that can inform intentionality judgements. Our results 
show that the influence of observers’ dispositional beliefs may be more prominent than 
previous social information models have indicated.  
Figure 14 shows TJM’s hypothesized pathway for the effect of morality on 
attributions of intentionality and blame: Observers’ moral beliefs (among various other 
things) affect whether the harm is judged as justified. Judgements of whether the harm is 
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justified affect intentionality judgements (unjustified harms are judged as intentional). Harms 
that are intentional are judged as more blameworthy.  
Figure 14  
Hypothesized pathway for Morality’s Effect on Attributions of Intentionality and Blame 
   
That morality and blame are linked is not the issue. Rather, it is where in the pathway 
morality is exerting its influence that is problematic. Reflectively, morality should arguably 
come after intentionality: A judgement has been made that a person caused harm 
intentionally or unintentionally, then this is factored into judgements of whether they did 
something morally wrong, with the end result being a judgement of blameworthiness. That 
morality seems to be earlier in the process—before intentionality judgements—is the issue.  
A modest take of our findings and this issue highlight a potential boundary condition 
for the rational use of social information: when there is a lack of information provided from 
the context about whether the harm is justified, people may use their own moral (and other) 
beliefs to judge the justifiability of the agent’s actions and infer their intentions. However, 
when information about whether the harm was justified is provided, people use that. Thus, 
the issue (people’s moral beliefs influencing intentionality judgements) only arises when the 
context is not explicitly providing information about the justifiability of the harm. 
On this modest version of TJM people may be theorizing about or simulating the 
mental states of the other person to see whether the action was justified for them within the 
context to infer intentionality. It is only when observers do not have enough information that 
they cannot theorize properly about or simulate accurately the person’s mental states that 
observers default to their own. Thus, when enough social information is provided, observer’s 
own morals beliefs etc., may not be affecting their judgements of intentionality. Instead, 
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observers are using the moral beliefs of the agent as a particular kind of mental state that can 
affect behavior, much like people may for other types of mental states (beliefs, desires, etc.).  
There is some evidence to support this modest version of TJM (e.g., Hindriks et al., 
2016; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010). For example, in a study by Uttich & Lombrozo (2010; 
Experiment 2) participants read about some supervillain’s henchmen who were tasked with 
being the badest of the bad, “...never passing up a chance to spread malice and evil (p.91)”. 
Analogous to the CEO example, a proposal is brought to one of the henchmen to rob a bank, 
which causes a harmful side-effect (increasing people’s susceptibility to a poison the 
supervillain is distributing by using a neurotoxin to incapacitate people in the bank) to which 
the henchman replies that they do not care about the harmful side-effect, they just want to get 
as much money as they can. Contrary to the CEO example, however, people tended to say the 
harmful side-effect was not intentional. Thus, when the context provides salient reason to 
believe the harm was justified (in this case it was presumably justified because the explicit 
norm is to do as much harm as possible) people seem to be using this information, rather than 
their own beliefs, to judge intentions. 
Uttich & Lomborozo’s (2010) results support a modest version of TJM by showing 
that observers can put aside their own beliefs and use the information provided. Critically, 
however, their scenario is rooted in a comic book like world where the authors go at length to 
provide a very explicit norm which is removed from the often messy and constantly changing 
world of norms in which people reside. The agent being judged in the scenario (a henchman 
of a supervillain) is also far removed from the typical everyday person that people are making 
their attributions about. Thus, it is still uncertain whether in more messy, ‘real’ cases whether 
observers will adopt the information from the context or stick to their own beliefs. Future 
research should investigate the degree to which this happens outside of the lab with the 
cognitive and time constraints people can be under when making these judgements.  
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The modest version of TJM still distinguishes between judgements of justifiability 
made from a non-meta perspective (the observer’s own) and those made from different meta-
perspectives (from the agents or from the common point of view). The boundary condition 
provides some evidence that the perspective taken may change from a non-meta perspective 
when certain conditions are met (i.e., when there is enough information to take on the agent’s 
or the social contexts perspective), though more research is required. We have some studies 
planned that will address that by testing the role of perspective-taking in judgments.  
Alternative Models 
It is no secret that psychology is inundated with models. The study of intentionality is 
no exception—even just a quick skim through the literature reveals a plethora of models each 
with their own unique take on what drives people’s judgements (e.g., deep-self models, 
Sripada, 2010; norm violation models, Uttich & lombrozo, 2010; trade-off models, Machery, 
2008; culpable control models, Alicke & Rose, 2010; see Cova, 2016; Knobe, 2010 for 
reviews). There are so many models that it can be hard for even a seasoned reader to tell the 
subtle differences between them and even harder to tease apart their predictions. Indeed, 
often different models are consistent with some of the same results, as is the case here.  For 
example, motivated blame models (e.g., Alicke, 2000, 2008), could be consistent with the 
finding that people judge harms caused to ingroup members (e.g., people supporting the same 
political cause, Experiment 6) as more intentional because of an increased desire to blame 
those who cause ingroup members’ harm. One could also argue that in Experiment 5 people 
of one nationality judged the harm as more intentional because in China is it the norm to send 
your children to cram school but not in America (Holton, 2010; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010). 
However, TJM has the advantage of generating the predictions a-priori—the Experiments 
were designed specifically to test TJM, and all results were consistent with the model’s 
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predictions. Moreover, alternate models may predict the same outcome but would not predict 
the same mediational pathway.  
Crucially, there are some models the results distinctly contradict, for example 
Machery’s (2008) Trade-off model. Machery (2008) argues that people infer intentionality 
from a person’s willingness to incur costs in a tradeoff. For example, the CEO incurs the cost 
of harming the environment to gain the benefit of profit, so people think the harm was 
intentionally incurred. Rather than this, our results show that it is the perceived willingness of 
the agent to incur costs without sufficient justification that reveals their intentions—harm 
alone does not lead to intention judgments, harm without justification does.  
Limitations 
In many of our experiments (e.g., Experiment’s 2a, b, 3a, b, 5) the harms were notably 
less severe than in previous research (e.g, Knobe, 2003). Lesser harms were chosen in 
Experiments 2a, b, 3a, and b so that increases in profit could affect the justifiability of the 
harm. If we used severe harms (e.g., environmental destruction, murder) then people may 
have perceived the harm as taboo and manipulating justifiability via increasing one factor 
(profit) would not be possible (Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000). As noted in Experiment 
5’s introduction, we chose a minor harm so that we could keep as much consistent across the 
vignettes as possible while still having the harm question make sense to people from both 
nationalities.  
One key point of evidence for TJM comes from the consistent mediational pathway—
as reported, the independent variable (e.g., profit) affects intention judgements via perceived 
justifiability. However, the mediator (perceived justifiability) was measured at the same time 
as the dependent variable (perceived intentionality) and thus cannot establish causality 
(Bullock et al., 2010). Nonetheless, the results are consistent with the proposed causal model. 
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Many experiments in the literature (see Knobe, 2010 for a review) have used a forced 
dichotomous yes/no response which does not capture the full range of judgements—
sometimes people really cannot tell whether something was brought about intentionally. 
Measures thus need to include a point for people to indicate when they are uncertain what a 
person intended. Our scales included such a measure. However, this change complicates 
comparisons with previous results. We have used the end points of the scale as a clear 
indication that people thought the harm was/was not intentionally caused. It is unclear how 
well this transfers to dichotomous scales. For instance, it could be that people responding yes 
on a dichotomous scale would report anywhere from a 5-7 on ours, or that people without 
complete confidence that it was intentional default to responding ‘no’ on dichotomous scales.  
Constraints on Generalizability 
Children as young as 4-5 have been shown to judge unjustified harmful side-effects as 
intentional (Leslie et al., 2006; Pellizzoni et al., 2009). The pathway for judging intentionality 
we specify is cognitively complex, involving an understanding of the social context and even 
potentially shifting one’s perspective. Given there is much cognitive development still to 
occur in young children and the complexity of the specified pathway, it is uncertain whether 
children are using the same pathway to arrive at their judgements. Future research should test 
the effects of manipulating the justifiability of harm on children’s judgements. 
In order to acquire large enough samples to sufficiently power our studies we used 
online crowd-sourcing platforms (i.e., Mechanical Turk, Prolific) and University student 
pools. Using multiple sources of recruitment allows generalization between more 
demographics than student pools alone. However, many demographics were not tested. For 
example, people with deficits in social cognition/theory of mind (e.g., people who have 
autism or Asperger’s) were not tested and may be less likely to show this effect due to their 
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limited ability to perceive and incorporate social information. For years psychological 
findings have been limited by being tested on WEIRD populations (Henrich, et al., 2010). 
New crowdsourcing platforms such as Mechanical Turk and Prolific have allowed us to 
collect data from 6 different countries that vary in cultural distance (see 
https://world.culturalytics.com for the exact cultural distance values; Muthukrishna et al., 
2020). We found support for the same pathway in each country, indicating that our model is 
culturally generalizable.  
Implications and Extensions of Research 
Judgements of intentionality have consequences—they impact legal, political, and 
social decisions, for example. Here, we successfully tested and extended a model for how 
people decide whether a harm was intentional—unjustified harms are judged intentional. This 
is important because what counts as unjustified varies because of individual differences in 
values and culture, thus potentially creating misunderstandings of whether a harm was 
intentional. Our research therefore suggests some potentially problematic ways that these 
highly consequential judgements might differ.  
For instance, laws are conceived and derived from values (Allsop, 2017) but also set 
the values or standards from which people within the legal system (e.g., judges, jury 
members) are required to make their judgements from. Different legal systems based on 
different values could essentially provide different perspectives from which to judge the 
justifiability of a harm and thus may lead to different convictions despite the facts of the case 
being exactly the same. For example, people within a legal system based on strong values of 
honor may perceive harms caused to a person’s reputation as far less justified and more 
intentional than people within a legal system that values honor comparatively less, leading to 
different sentences. Future research should investigate how the expression of different values 
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across legal systems (such as honor or justice) may affect the perceived justifiability and 
intentionality of harms. If the different values across legal systems affect the perceived 
justifiability and intentionality of harms, this raises serious questions about how judges and 
juries should establish intentionality for defendants whose values differ from the system in 
which they are being trialed. 
Problems caused by judgements of justifiability based on different norms/values also 
likely occur outside of legal contexts. Indeed, this difference in values may underlie some of 
the conflicts between different political groups—people may be seen as having malicious, 
harmful intentions for doing things that are justified by their group’s standards. Martin 
Gugino’s case is an example of this. Most people who identified strongly with Blue Lives 
Matter saw the officer as using a justified means to disperse a protestor breaking curfew, and 
thus perceived no harmful intentions. Most people who identified strongly with Black Lives 
Matter, however, saw the officer as unjustifiably putting down a legitimate protester, and 
perceived the harm as clearly intentional. One group thus had reason to support the officer’s 
suspension, whereas others saw the reason behind the officer’s suspension as unjustified and 
protested it (Li & Imam, 2020, June 6). Future research should test the extent to which people 
change their judgements upon learning a group’s justification for causing the harm.  
Concluding statement 
Intentionality judgements are interesting, important, and somewhat mysterious too: 
the minds of others are invisible, so how are people determining whether others caused harm 
intentionally? Our research shows that people use information about the justifiability of 
causing the harm when judging whether it was intentional—harms caused without sufficient 
reasons are judged as intentional. Crucially, however, people’s cultural and group identities 
can change the norms/values used to judge whether the harm was justified, and, 
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consequently, whether the harm is judged intentional. People’s perceptions of others are thus 
informed by their personal identities, meaning that people’s judgements of whether a harm 
was caused on purpose will cohere or conflict based on whether they agree or disagree that 
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Appendix A:  Vignettes and Questions in Experiment 1 
1. Sally saw a runaway trolley barreling down the railway tracks. Ahead, on the tracks she 
saw 5 people tied up and unable to move with the trolley heading straight for them. She 
saw a lever that could switch the trolley to a different set of tracks where only one person 
was tied up and unable to move. Sally pulled the lever, saving the 5 people but killing the 
other.  
Did Sally intentionally kill the other person?  
Was Sally’s decision to pull the lever justified? 
 
 
2. Mark saw a runaway trolley barreling down the railway tracks. Ahead on the tracks he 
saw his mother tied up and unable to move with the trolley heading straight for her. He 
saw a lever that could switch the trolley to a different set of tracks where a stranger was 
tied up and unable to move. Mark pulled the lever, saving his mother but killing the 
stranger.  
Did Mark intentionally kill the stranger?  
Was Mark’s decision to pull the lever justified? 
 
 
3. Jim, a prisoner of war, was given a choice by his captors. In front of Jim there was a row 
of 20 other prisoners of war tied up against a wall. Jim could choose to shoot one and the 
other 19 would be set free, or he could not shoot anyone, and all of them would be shot. 
Jim decided to shoot one of the prisoners.  
Did Jim intentionally kill the prisoner?  
Was Jim’s decision to shoot the prisoner justified? 
 
 
4. Jacob threw a party to be more popular. Jacob knew his party would make Curtis, his 
roommate, fail the morning's exam.  
Did Jacob intentionally make Curtis fail the morning's exam?  
Was Jacob’s decision to throw a party justified? 
 
 
5. Russell planted a tree to decorate his yard. Russell knew his tree would block his 
neighbor’s sun, making them unhappy.  
Did Russell intentionally make his neighbor unhappy?  
Was Russell’s decision to plant the tree justified? 
 
6. A Party was thinking about implementing a new policy. The policy would allow them to 
remain politically popular by increasing GDP but would also increase deaths. The party 
decided to implement the policy. Sure enough, the amount of death increased.  
Did the Party intentionally increase deaths?  
Was the party’s decision to implement the policy justified? 
 
7. Eugene screamed during a tennis match to express his excitement, but Eugene knew his 
screaming would also put his opponent off.  
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Was Eugene intentionally putting off his opponent?  
Is Eugene justified in screaming during the match? 
 
 
8. Curtis released the documents to gain publicity. Curtis knew the documents would ruin 
his friend's reputation.  
Did Curtis intentionally ruin his friend's reputation?  
Was Curtis’ decision to release the documents justified? 
 
 
9. The abolitionist movement in Laputa was aimed at ending slavery in the country. 
However, supporters of this movement also knew that ending slavery would have 
negative effects on the economy. The movement was successful and, sure enough, there 
were negative effects on the country's economy.  
Did the supporters intentionally harm the economy?  
Were the supporters justified in ending slavery? 
 
10. Affirmative action is aimed at increasing the opportunities provided to underrepresented 
parts of society. This movement will increase opportunity for underrepresented groups 
but also decrease opportunity for overrepresented groups.  
Is this movement intentionally decreasing opportunity for overrepresented groups?  
Is the movement justified in decreasing opportunity for overrepresented groups? 
 
 
11. Mary, a doctor, was thinking about going on a spontaneous holiday. She knew if she 
cancelled all her appointments and left that not all her patients would be able to rebook 
with another doctor, causing them to become more ill than they otherwise would have. 
Mary decided to cancel all her appointments and go on holiday anyway. Sure enough, not 
all of her patients were able to rebook with another doctor, causing some of them to 
become more ill than they otherwise would have.  
Did Mary intentionally cause her patients to become more ill than they otherwise would 
have?  
Was Mary’s decision to go on holiday justified? 
 
 
12. Jane, a doctor, got a call that her dog was missing. She knew if she cancelled all her 
appointments to go find her dog that not all of her patients would be able to rebook with 
another doctor, causing them to become more ill than they otherwise would have. Jane 
decided to cancel all her appointments and go find her dog anyway. Sure enough, not all 
of her patients were able to rebook with another doctor, causing some of them to become 
more ill than they otherwise would have. 
Did Jane intentionally cause her patients to become more ill than they otherwise would 
have? 
Was Jane’s decision to go find her dog justified? 
 
13. The president of a developing country knew about a coal mining programme that would 
bring the country great economic prosperity but also greatly harm the environment. The 
president implemented the programme. Sure enough, the programme brought the country 
great economic prosperity but also greatly harmed the environment.  
Did the president intentionally harm the environment?  
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Was the president’s decision to implement the program justified? 
 
 
14. The president of a developed country knew about a coal mining programme that would 
bring minor benefits to the economy but also greatly harm the environment. The president 
implemented the programme. Sure enough, the programme brought minor benefits to the 
economy but also greatly harmed the environment.  
Did the president intentionally harm the environment?  
Was the president’s decision to implement the program justified? 
 
15. Jo owns a donut store. He was thinking of closing the store early so he could go home and 
look after his very sick child, but Jo knew that closing early would annoy the customers 
who were coming to buy his donuts. Jo decided to close anyway. Sure enough, the 
customers arrived and the place was closed, really annoying them.   
Did Jo intentionally annoy the people?  
Was Jo’s decision to close his store justified? 
 
16. Mark is a mechanic who owns a garage.He was thinking of closing the store early so he 
could go home and get ready for his date, but Mark knew that closing early would annoy 
Fred who had an appointment that evening to get his car fixed. Mark decided to close 
anyway. Sure enough, when Fred arrived to get his car fixed he found the garage closed, 
really annoying him.  
Did Mark intentionally annoy Fred?  
Was Fred’s decision to close his garage justified? 
 
17. Josh is an on call emergency worker. He turned his buzzer off so that he would not get 
disrupted on his date. A person called in needing urgent medical help but Josh did not 
pick up. Luckily, they were able to get someone else to help.   
Did Josh intentionally put people at risk by turning his buzzer off?  
Was Josh’s decision to turn off his buzzer justified? 
 
18. Frank is an on call emergency worker. He went to go visit his dying wife in hospital and 
turned his buzzer off so that their last moments together would not be disrupted. A person 
called in needing urgent medical help but Frank did not pick up. Luckily, they were able 
to get someone else to help.  
Did Frank intentionally put people at risk by turning his buzzer off?  
Was Frank’s decision to turn off his buzzer justified? 
 
19. The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We are 
thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm 
the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about harming 
the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.” They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.  
Did the chairman of the board intentionally harm the environment?  
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Appendix B: Vignettes and Questions in Experiment 4 
 
New justifying information condition. 
1. Ted 
Ted answered a phone call during a movie, despite knowing it would annoy the other 
people in the theatre.  
 
Did Ted intentionally annoy the other people in the theatre? 
Was Ted justified in answering the phone call? 
 
New info: Ted’s mother was in hospital having open heart surgery and he’d been 
expecting a call from the hospital. 
 
2. Frank 
Frank is an on call emergency worker. He had turned his buzzer off for a moment so 
that he wouldn’t be disrupted. A person called in needing urgent medical help but 
Frank did not pick up. Luckily, they were able to get someone else to help. 
 
Did Frank intentionally put people at risk by turning his buzzer off?  
Was Frank’s decision to turn off his buzzer justified? 
 
New info: Frank had gone to go visit his dying wife in hospital and turned his buzzer 
off so that their last moments together would not be disrupted. 
 
3. CEO 
The CEO of a company started a new programme to increase company profits despite 
knowing it would harm the environment. 
 
Did the CEO intentionally harm the environment? 
Was the CEO justified in starting the programme? 
 
Update: The CEO’s daughter had been kidnapped and they needed the company to 
make more money in order to be able to pay for her ransom.  
 
4. Andrew 
A little old lady came onto the bus and needed a place to sit. Andrew knew she’d 
stumble and hurt herself as the bus took off if she didn’t get a seat. Yet, Andrew did 
not offer his seat to her. She didn’t get a seat and, sure enough, as the bus took off the 
lady stumbled and hurt herself. 
 
Did Andrew intentionally cause the old lady to get hurt? 
Was Andrew justified in not giving up his seat? 
 
New info:  
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Jerry and a friend are at a bar and they both leave the table briefly, leaving their 
jackets on the seats, to get some food and drinks. When they return, two female 
strangers are sitting in their seats. Jerry explains to them that they have been sitting 
there. Much to Jerry’s annoyance they reply ‘‘you’ll have go find another table, and 
hand them their jackets back.’’ 
 
Did the two women intentionally annoy Jerry? 
Were the two women justified in taking the seat? 
 
New info: The bar is extremely popular and in order to turn people in and out quickly 
has a very clear rule that no seats can be saved—you move you lose. 
 
New justifying information condition. 
 
6. Tom 
While playing a round of golf with his dad, Tom tried a shot from an odd angle and 
ended up smashing one of the neighbouring houses windows.   
 
Did Tom intentionally smash the neighbours window? 
Was Tom Justified in trying a shot from an odd angle? 
 
New info: Before taking the shot Tom’s dad had yelled at him and warned him not to 
hit the ball that way as it would likely hit the neighbours window. 
 
7. Jordan 
A group of coworkers go out for lunch but do not invite Jordan, who was absent from 
her desk. Jordan was upset that the others did not invite her. 
 
Are the coworkers intentionally upsetting Jordan? 
Are the coworkers justified in going out for lunch without Jordan? 
 
New Info: When they got back Jordan asked why they didn’t invite her. One of the 
coworkers laughed and said that they didn’t want to be associated with someone of 
her kind.  
 
8. Angela 
Angela filled her desk up with houseplants, making her desk smell lovely but really 
annoying one of her coworkers. 
 
Did Angela intentionally annoy her co-worker? 
Was Angela justified in bringing in the houseplants? 
 
New info: Angela had been asked, many, many times by her co-worker to please 
not bring in any houseplants as it gave her bad allergies. 
9. Gary 
Gary used some of the communal supplies in his office while making a paper mache 
for his friend's birthday, annoying one of his colleagues. 
 
Did Gary intentionally annoy his colleague?  
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Was Gary justified in taking the office supplies? 
 
New info: Gary already had plenty of his own supplies to use but would still 
repeatedly take stuff from the communal supplies, despite knowing his coworker 
needed the supplies to complete an important work order. 
 
10. Stephen 
Stephen returned his students’ graded assignments late, despite knowing this would 
annoy them.  
 
Did Stephen intentionally annoy his students? 
Was Stephen justified in handing the assignments back late? 
 
New info: When another professor asked Stephen why he did not finish grading the 
assignments on time despite knowing it would annoy his students he replied, “I don’t 
care that it annoyed them, I was busy finishing my own manuscript” 
 
Irrelevant new information condition. 
 
11. Sarah 
Sarah snuck into her sister’s room when she was out and took one of her tops to wear, 
despite knowing it would annoy her. Sure enough, when her sister found out, she was 
very annoyed. 
 
Did Sarah intentionally annoy her sister? 
Was Sarah justified in taking her sister’s top? 
 
New info: The top Sarah took was red. 
 
12. Lisa 
Lisa left her dirty dishes sitting on the bench all day despite knowing it would annoy 
her flatmates.  
 
Did Lisa intentionally annoy her flatmates? 
Was Lisa justified in leaving the dishes out? 
 
New info: Lisa’s birthday is on a Friday this year. 
 
13. Paul 
Paul’s mother’s birthday was coming up and a big celebration was being planned. 
Paul’s sister had planned the event and given all the siblings strict instructions to be 
on time because of how sad their mother gets whenever someone’s late to a family 
event—their mother believes that being late is a sign that a person doesn’t want to be 
there. Despite all this forewarning, Paul still showed up late, making his mother sad. 
 
Did Paul intentionally make his mother sad?  
Was Paul justified in turning up late? 
 
New info: Paul is the tallest out of all his siblings. 
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14. Jacob 
Jacob threw a party despite knowing that it would make Curtis, his roommate, fail the 
morning's exam.  
 
Did Jacob intentionally make Curtis fail the morning's exam?  
Was Jacob’s decision to throw a party justified? 
 
New info: Jacob and Curtis both have hazel eyes. 
 
15. Mike 
Mike’s coworker had been talking on the telephone for over an hour and a half despite 
knowing they were supposed to be helping Mike. Consequently, Mike had to stay late 
to get the project done before the deadline.  
 
Did Mike’s coworker intentionally cause Mike to have to stay late? 
Was Mike’s coworker justified in talking to their friend on the phone for over an hour 
and a half?  
 
New info: Mike and his coworker are about the same height. 
 
 
